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THE CANADA CHILD TAX BENEFIT:
INCOME SUPPORT AND THE TAX SYSTEM
FELICITE STAIRS*
RESUMEt
Dans cet article, on analyse l'efficacit6 du r6gime fiscal en tant que m6canisme de
distribution de soutien du revenu aux families A faible revenu avec enfants. L'auteur
commence en traitant de l'6volution des prestations pour les enfants au Canada.
L'auteur examine ensuite l'affaiblissement de l'ttat providence et met en contexte la
presentation de la Prestation fiscale canadienne pour enfants. Cela est suivi par une
r~flexion sur les avantages et les inconv~nients de l'aide de l'ttat par l'interm~diaire
des r6gimes de l'imp6t sur le revenu et d'aide sociale. L'auteur conclut que le regime
fiscal ne peut remplacer le regime d'aide sociale comme moyen d'offrir un soutien au
revenu A l'intention des enfants.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The National Child Benefit
When the National Child Benefit was officially launched in June, 1998, the federal,
provincial and territorial governments heralded it as "the most important social
program in thirty years".' The National Child Benefit (NCB) is a "system" of benefits
and services for low and moderate income families with children. It includes income
support, as well as programs and services designed to assist low income families. It
features an income-tested "integrated child benefit", the Canada Child Tax Benefit
(CCTB), which integrates federal benefits for children delivered through the tax
system with provincial benefits for children delivered through social assistance
programs. Under the NCB, all children of low and moderate income families are
eligible for the CCTB, regardless of the source of their parents' income. Prior to the
introduction of the NCB, all families with children received benefits through the tax
system. In addition, families receiving social assistance received a portion of their
social assistance benefits as income support for their children. It is intended that, as
* Felicite Stairs is a Staff Lawyer with Renfrew County Legal Clinic. She is also a LL.M candidate at
the Faculty of Law of the University of Ottawa. This article is her major research paper, which has
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program.
1. Human Resources Development Canada, News Release, "The National Child Benefit: Improved
Benefit for Children in Low-Income Families to Begin in July, 1998" (15 June 1998).
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the CCTB is enriched, it will eventually replace children's benefits under the social
assistance system entirely.
In addition to income support, the NCB "system" comprises provincially funded
programs and services to assist low income families. These programs and services are
known as "reinvestment strategies", and include child care programs, extended health
benefits, and provincially enriched child benefits. They are paid for by the provinces
and territories from money saved by the reduced amount of social assistance paid to
families with children under the NCB. Reinvestment strategies vary from province to
province. They are not subject to national standards, and differ in the extent to which
they assist all low income people or are targeted only at the "working poor".2
The federal child benefit was the product of many years of policy analysis and
advocacy by numerous individuals and groups. When it was finally introduced, the
Canadian welfare state had been under attack for two decades. While it may be true
that the NCB is the most important social program in thirty years, it is also one of the
only programs to be introduced in that period. Not only have few new programs been
introduced, old ones have been abolished, and those that remain in place have been
seriously eroded.3 It is within the context of this "hollowing out" of the welfare state
that the National Child Benefit was introduced, and against this background that it
must be evaluated.
This paper examines the use of the income tax system to deliver income support for
children of low income families. There are advantages and disadvantages to using the
income tax system, rather than the social assistance system, arising from both institu-
tional factors and political choices.4 Institutional factors are constraints placed on the
system by its statutory and administrative frameworks, as well as the "cultures"
surrounding the program. When there are no limiting institutional constraints, the
choice of particular design features may be entirely political. For example, what
"income" is used for the purpose of income-testing the benefit is limited to what is
considered "income" for tax purposes, or a subset thereof, as these are the only figures
collected under the income tax system. In contrast, many eligibility requirements,
choice of benefit unit, and benefit rates are examples of political choices. Institutional
factors and political choices often interact. The ability to assess income but not assets
in the income tax system is an institutional factor, which influences the political choice
of whether or not benefits should be income or means tested. Of course, institutional
factors result from political choices in the past and are themselves subject to change,
2. Human Resources Development Canada, Update on Reinvestments Under the National Child Benefit
(Information Package) (15 June 1998).
3. See M. Hess, The Canadian Fact Book on Income Security Programs (Ottawa: Canadian Council on
Social Development, 1992); C. Clark, Canada's Income Security Programs (Ottawa: Canadian
Council on Social Development, 1998).
4. A. Alstott, 'Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional Choices" (1996) 8 Colum.
L. Rev. 2001.
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albeit not easily. However, the concept is useful in evaluating which advantages and
disadvantages are potentially mutable and the likelihood of change. 5
In this paper, I take the position that the tax system cannot replace the social assistance
system in the delivery of basic income support for children. While the stronger social
rights associated with the tax system give it an advantage over the social assistance
system, the institutional limitations of the tax system result in a only a very rough fit
between those in need and the provision of benefits. The technical complexity of the
tax system makes understanding and challenging decisions made under it very difficult
for many recipients. Further, many of the perceived advantages of the tax system are
in fact political choices that may be renegotiated in the future. The potential exists to
import the intrusiveness and stigma attached to the receipt of "public assistance" to
the receipt of child benefits. The perceived advantages of the tax system could be
brought into the social assistance system if the political will existed. Our failure to
address and oppose the "hollowing out" of the welfare state and the loss of social rights
occurring as a result makes it unlikely that either system will be effective in tackling
child poverty in the near future.
The first part of this paper sets the context for the introduction of the NCB through a
discussion of the welfare state and a brief history of child benefits in Canada. I then
outline the tax and social assistance systems and describe child benefits under both,
as well as how the benefits are integrated in Ontario. Ontario is used as an example,
but many of the conclusions apply generally across Canada. This is followed by a
discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of each system in delivering income
assistance. A preliminary evaluation is offered of the design of the Canada Child Tax
Benefit, including the integrated benefit, in meeting the goals set for child benefits.
Finally, I look at whether and how the NCB fits into the process of the hollowing out
of the welfare state.
B. The Context: the Hollowed-out Welfare State
The welfare state includes programs and services to mitigate against the impact of
uncontrolled markets, as well as the redistribution of income through transfer pay-
ments. The Canadian welfare state grew from a foundation of provincial Workers'
Compensation, Unemployment Insurance, Old Age Security and the Family Allow-
ance program. The Canada Pension Plan, the Guaranteed Income Supplement and the
Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) were implemented in the mid 1960s. CAP provided
for federal-provincial cost-sharing and national standards for health, education and
social assistance programs. 6 However, by the time the National Child Benefit program
was introduced in 1998, the Unemployment Insurance Act had been replaced by the
Employment Insurance Act,7 and eligibility had been severely restricted. As well, the
5. While economic considerations also affect political choices, if the political will exists, the money
generally follows.
6. Hess, supra note 3.
7. Unemployment Insurance Act, R.S.C. 1985, U-1 [repealed by S.C. 1996, c.C-23, s.155]. Employ-
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CAP had been replaced by the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST) and funding
for social assistance programs was reduced. Only one "national standard" for social
assistance programs remained in the CHST: the right to receive social assistance in
any province or territory in which the applicant is resident. The other social rights
embedded in the CAP requirements, such as the right to an appeal system, the right to
receive benefits based on need and the prohibition against work-for-welfare programs,
were left out of the CHST.8 Provincial legislation enacted following the introduction
of the CHST severely restricted eligibility and imposed work-for-welfare require-
ments even on single mothers with young children. 9 During the same time period, the
federal Family Allowance program was transformed in several stages from a universal
flat-rate tax-free benefit to an income tested refundable child tax benefit with a
supplement for working families, making Canada one of only two OECD countries
without some form of tax recognition for all children. 10
The welfare state was based on a shared understanding that the state should have a
central and direct role in improving the lives of its citizens. Hollowing out the welfare
state has meant not only gutting social programs, but also changing expectations about
the role of the state and the social rights of its citizens. The purpose of the state is
increasingly accepted as being a "midwife to globalization", resulting in social policy
dictated by the needs of the market. 11 As economics is elevated above politics, it is
constructed as politically neutral, scientific and inevitable. Whole areas of social
policy are thus removed from the possibility of political negotiation by the exigencies
of "economics". 12
Restructuring the state and its relationship with its citizens has a particularly detri-
mental effect on women. 13 Although the relationship between women and the welfare
state is complex, 14 women have relied on and worked through the state to ameliorate
ment Insurance Act, S.C. 1996, c.23.
8. The Budget Implementation Act, 1995, S.C. 1995, c.17; Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.F-8; Canada Assistance Plan Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.C- 1.
9. For an overview of provincial programs, see National Council of Welfare, Another Look at Welfare
Reform (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997) [hereinafter
Another Look].
10. Hess, supra note 3 at 27-33; J. R. Kesselman, "The Child Benefit: Simple, Fair, Responsive?" (1993)
19 Can. Pub. Pol. 110 at 117.
11. J. Brodie, "Canadian Women, Changing State Forms, and Public Policy" in J. Brodie, ed., Women
and Canadian Public Policy (Toronto: Harcourt Brace, 1996) at 14-15.
12. Ibid. at 15-17; L. Philipps, "Discursive Deficits: A Feminist Perspective on the Power of Technical
Knowledge in Fiscal Law and Policy" (1996) 11 Can. J. L. & Society 141.
13. Brodie, Ibid.; P. M. Evans & G.R. Wekerle, "'he Shifting Terrain of Women's Welfare: Theory,
Discourse, and Activism" in P.M. Evans & G. R. Wekerle, eds., Women and the Canadian Welfare
State: Challenges and Change (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) 3 at 7; 1. Bakker, "Intro-
duction: The Gendered Foundations of Restructuring in Canada" in I. Bakker, ed., Rethinking
Restructuring: Gender and Change in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996) and
other articles in this volume; L. Ricciutelli, J. Larkin & E. O'Neill, eds., Confronting the Cuts: A
Sourcebook for Women in Ontario (Toronto: Ianna, 1998).
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the worst disadvantages suffered because of their caregiving roles, their labour market
disadvantage and traditional gender relations. Income support, social housing, and
child care programs have assisted women in supporting their families and accessing
paid work, while pay equity, sexual harassment laws and employment protection laws
have furthered their ability to maintain employment. Divorce and family laws and the
existence of shelters and other support services for abused women as well as income
supports have given women options to leave abusive marriages. Erosion of these
services traps many women in desperate poverty and dangerous relationships.
The contraction of social programs and services has resulted not only in a deterioration
in the material circumstances of women, it has also brought with it new exclusions
from the rights of citizenship. Although the prototypical social citizen upon which the
welfare state was founded was white and male, women and other equity-seeking
groups worked to enlarge this concept. Much of this work is in serious jeopardy. By
basing the rights of social citizenship on self-reliance and full participation in the
labour market, new programs necessarily exclude many women with caregiving
responsibilities. The use of gender neutral language in entitlements cannot hide the
reality that women are once again being constructed as "second class citizens",
although not quite in the same way as in the past.' 5 Not all women are affected equally
by the current contraction of the welfare state and the derogation of social rights.
Women whose history is most like that of men, that is, childless women with full-time
employment or those who can afford replacement caregivers (nannies) suffer less than
other women. Further, basing social rights on the status of (self-reliant) worker also
excludes those men who, like women, face barriers to attachment to the labour market,
whether through race or ethnic origin, disability or lack ofj obs, training or opportunity.
Those most affected are those with multiple barriers, including single mothers.
Women are also the ones most severely affected by the push to privatize and refamilial-
ize services. Under the neoliberal order, the family is seen as the site of responsibility
and self-sufficiency. As the state retracts from the responsibility of providing services,
families and communities are expected to take up the slack. In reality, this means
women. Women provide the majority of unpaid caregiving work, and the burden of
not only child care but elder care and care for the disabled is falling on them as the
welfare state contracts. 16 This further limits their ability to participate fully as "citi-
zen-workers" and consigns many to long term poverty.
14. For a good recent review of the literature, see A. Orloff, "Gender in the Welfare State" (1966) 22
Ann. Rev. Sociol. 51. See also L. Gordon, ed., Women and the Welfare State (Madison: University
of Wisconsin Press, 1990).
15. Supra note 11 at 18-20; P.M. Evans, "Divided Citizenship? Gender, Income Security and the Wel-
fare State" in Evans & Wekerle, supra note 13, 91; A. Orloff (1993) "Gender and the Social Rights
of Citizenship: the Comparative Analysis of Gender Relations and Welfare States" 58 Am. Soc. Rev.
303 at 308-309.
16. Brodie, supra note 11 at 22-23; Evans & Wekerle, supra note 13; P. Armstrong, "Unravelling the
Social Safety Net: Transformations in Health Care and Their Impact on Women" in J. Brodie, ed.,
supra note 11, 129.
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Privatization and refamilialization also means that any private means of income
support is privileged over public support. The mantra that we can no longer afford our
social programs has led to the popularity of replacing universal entitlements with
targeted income support. Even unemployment insurance benefits, funded as a social
insurance program, now contains income-tested benefits. 17 Social entitlements are
thus increasingly becoming residual programs: claimants are expected to pursue all
sources of private (labour market and family) income before public assistance.
In my view, the NCB must be evaluated in the context of these ongoing processes:
namely, taking policy out of the realm of political negotiation through the use of
technical discourse, basing social citizenship on the extent of labour market partici-
pation, excluding women from full social rights, and privileging private support over
public entitlement. Unfortunately, this preliminary evaluation indicates that, despite
its presentation, the National Child Benefit conforms to the patterns of hollowing out
the welfare state outlined above, rather than representing fundamental, progressive
reform of that state.
C. The Child Benefit in Canada: Changing Goals, Changing Programs
In many ways, the history of the federal child benefit reflects the history of the welfare
state in Canada.18 The earliest form of "child benefit" was the child tax exemption,
instituted in 1919, only two years after federal income tax was introduced. Its purpose
was to reduce the tax payable by taxpayers with children, in recognition of the fact
that having children reduced the amount of income available to pay tax. The rationale
for it was entirely based on tax principles, and it had no effect on people with no taxable
income.
The next phase of child benefits began with the release of a report by Leonard Marsh
on a comprehensive social security system for Canada. 19 He proposed a child benefit
to recognize the needs of children apart from their parents, as part of the provision of
a social minimum for all Canadian families, and to compensate for the failure of wage
and social security programs to take children into account. In 1945, the Family
Allowance program was instituted. This provided a universal, non-taxable, monthly
benefit to all families with children, payable to the mother. The Family Allowance
program made child benefits a social right.
The 1970s saw a move toward "progressive universality". 20 Family Allowances
became taxable, but only at the marginal tax rate of the lower income spouse. In 1979,
17. Clark, supra note 3 at 53-54.
18. For the history of the child benefit, see K. Battle & M. Mendelson, Child Benefit Reform in Canada:
an Evaluative Framework and Future Directions (Ottawa: Caledon Institute, 1997) 7-15; Clark,
supra note 3 at 1-7.
19. Canada, Special Committee on Social Security, Advisory Committee on Reconstruction, Report on
Social Security for Canada by L.C. Marsh (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, Printer to the King's Most
Excellent Majesty, 1943).
20. Supra note 18 at 8.
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a refundable child tax credit was also introduced, providing child benefits through the
tax system for the first time to families too poor to pay tax. Since then, child benefits
have become increasingly targeted to families in need. In 1988, the child tax exemption
was reduced and then converted into a non-refundable tax credit.21 In 1989, Family
Allowances began to be clawed back completely from higher income families. Finally,
in 1993, the Family Allowance, child tax credit and refundable child tax credit were
rolled into one program, the Child Tax Benefit.
The Child Tax Benefit was an income-tested monthly benefit, delivered through the
income tax system.22 It featured a base amount as well as a Working Income Supple-
ment, available to families with earned income above $3750. It was designed to
provide the same level of benefits for low income families as they had under the old
Family Allowance, refundable and non-refundable tax credit system. Benefits for
middle income families were reduced and higher income families lost their benefits
entirely. The stated goal was to rationalize and simplify benefits for children, and to
provide an incentive for low income families to enter the labour market. While
received by most Canadians, for the first time the child benefit was no longer available
as a social right to all families with children, but became contingent on "need".
The final stage of child benefits was the introduction of the CCTB as part of the NCB
in 1998. The 1993 Child Tax. Benefit was redesigned and enriched, the Working
Income Supplement was repealed and further enhancements for the benefit were
promised for the future. The NCB was the product of a number of factors. The first
factor was concern about the deficit and its perceived relationship to social program
spending, which resulted in a major review and revision of all social security programs
in 1993.23 A second factor was provincial dissatisfaction with federal activity in
matters perceived to be within provincial jurisdiction, as well as with the duplication
of programs.24 These factors both encouraged the federal government to reduce its
role in social programs and to develop new ways of working with the provinces. The
NCB ensured that the federal government still retained visibility as a leader in social
program development, despite vacating much of its financial responsibility. The
21. A deduction has the same regressive effect as an exemption: it is deducted from taxable income. In a
progressive tax system, it has more value for high income taxpayers than for those with lower
incomes, as it is deducted from income otherwise taxable at a higher marginal rate. Credits are
deducted from tax liability, and therefore are worth the same amount of dollars for taxpayers in all
tax brackets. Non-refundable credits are only useful for those with tax owing. Refundable credits are
available to those without tax owing as well as those with.
22. Canada, Ministry of Health and Welfare, The Child Benefit: A White Paper on Canada's Integrated
Child Tax Benefit (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1992).
23. Human Resources Development Canada, Improving Social Security in Canada: A Discussion Paper
(Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1994).
24. This led to the convening of the Federal/Provincial/Territorial Ministerial Council on Social Policy
Renewal in 1995. See Canada, Ministerial Council on Social Policy Reform and Renewal, Report to
Premiers (Ministerial Council on Social Policy Reform and Renewal, December 1995).
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development of the NCB also provided an example of how cooperative federalism
could work.2
5
A third factor in the development of the National Child Benefit system was increasing
public awareness and concern with child poverty. In 1989, there were 934,000 children
living in poverty, 14.5% of all children in Canada. 26 Appalled by the high numbers of
children in poverty in an affluent country, in 1989 the House of Commons passed a
resolution to eliminate child poverty in Canada by the year 2000. This resolution had
the support of all political parties.27 Despite the resolution, Campaign 2000 reported
that in 1995 there were 1,472,000 children living in poverty or 21% of all children. 28
They called for an enhanced child benefit, available to all low and moderate income
families regardless of their income source, as one part of the solution. 29
A fourth factor in promoting the development of the NCB was the push for welfare
reform. Many provincial social assistance programs had been in place since shortly
after the enactment of CAP in 1966. Welfare rolls swelled with the recession in the
late 1980's and early 1990's, and continued into the mid-1990's as a result of the
"jobless recovery" from the recession as well as the expansion of eligibility rules to
cover more people in need. In addition, more people were forced to apply for welfare
as changes to unemployment insurance restricted eligibility and reduced benefits. 30
Governments and policy analysts began to blame "passive income support" for
fostering "dependency" resulting in high welfare rolls, despite the lack of empirical
evidence. 31 They advocated the introduction of "employment enhancement" activities
including employment supports, work-for-welfare requirements and eligibility restric-
tions. 32
Further, economic analysis of the costs associated with leaving welfare for work led
to the concept of the "welfare wall". 33 People trying to leave social assistance for
25. Cooperative federalism is also called "executive federalism" by those who criticize the fact that the
process of social policy renewal, reform and defining the social union is being done by First Minis-
ters behind closed doors: S. Day & G. Brodsky, Women and the Equality Deficit: the Impact of
Restructuring Canada's Social Programs (Ottawa: Status of Women Canada, 1998) at 28-29.
26. Campaign 2000, Report Card 1997. See also Campaign 2000's previous report cards. Campaign
2000 is a coalition of child poverty activists committed to keeping child poverty on the policy
agenda.
27. House of Commons Debates (24 November 1989) at 6173-6178 (E. Broadbent); (24 November
1989) at 6178-6181 (P. Beatty); (24 November 1989) at 6188 (E. Broadbent); (24 November 1989)
at 6188-6189 (P. Beatty).
28. Supra note 26.
29. M. Novick & R. Shillington, Crossroads for Canada: a Time to Invest in Children and Families
(Toronto: Campaign 2000, 1996).
30. Supra note 9.
31. J. Brodie, "Restructuring and the New Citizenship" in I. Bakker, supra note 13, 126; N. Fraser & L.
Gordon, "A Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword of the US Welfare State" Signs 19:2
(1994).
32. Supra note 9.
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employment face a number of barriers: they not only face high tax-back rates while
working and receiving supplementary welfare benefits, but in the process of making
the transition they lose all cash benefits, including those for children as well as medical
and dental benefits. Reform efforts have focused on breaking down the welfare wall,
that is, making sure that people are always better off working.
Finally, the increasing demonization of the welfare poor provided support for the
concept of "taking children off welfare" by providing benefits to children through a
less stigmatizing and intrusive system than the welfare system. Several provinces
considered and some enacted a child benefit, integrating national and provincial
benefits, as part of their welfare reform. 34
D. Goals of the NCB
The impetus for an enriched national child benefit came from many diverse groups,
each with their own vision and goals for the program. Historically, the goals of federal
child benefits have centred on horizontal equity, recognition of the contribution
parents make to society by raising children and, more recently, income support for
children of poor families. However, the official goals of the National Child Benefit
System are somewhat different. They are:
1. to help prevent and reduce the depth of child poverty;
2. to promote attachment to the workforce, resulting in fewer families having to
rely on social assistance by ensuring that families will always be better off as a
result of finding work; and
3. to reduce overlap and duplication through closer harmonization of program
objectives and benefits and through simplified administration. 35
These goals reflect the priorities of Social Service Ministers concerned with reducing
welfare rolls, rather than the priorities of the tax experts concerned with tax equity
who helped to shape earlier forms of the child benefit. They are also not necessarily
those put forward by social policy analysts and child poverty activists who worked
hard to promote the creation of the benefit. Many of these groups retain the traditional
tax goal of horizontal equity. 36 Some believe that a program such as the NCB should
33. K. Battle & S. Torjman, The Welfare Wall: The Interaction of the Welfare and Tax Systems (Ottawa:
Caledon Institute, 1993); Canada, Department of Finance, Building the Future for Canadians Budget
1997: Working Together Towards a National Child Benefit System (18 February 1997) at 9-10. The
"welfare wall" also includes various aspects of the effect of the tax system on welfare, such as the
income tax threshold, payroll taxes, the effect on refundable credits.
34. Ontario, Report of the Social Assistance Review Committee: Transitions (Toronto: Queen's Printer,
13 May 1998) (Chair- G. Thomson) at 115-18 [hereinafter Transitions]; Ontario, Turning Point: New
Support Programs for People with Low Incomes (Toronto, 1994) at 17; Supra note 9 at 92-101.
35. Canada, supra note 33 at 15.
36. Kesselman, supra note 10 at 117-9; R. Shillington, Child Benefits: Notes on the Federal
Government's Supplementary Paper "Income Security for Children" (Canadian Advisory Council
on the Status of Women, November 1994) at 1.
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recognize and reflect society's shared responsibility for children. 37 As well, some
believe it should also promote the "independence and dignity" of recipients by
providing benefits in a non-intrusive, non-stigmatizing way.38
Finally, anti-poverty activists representing low income people have identified other,
more specific goals for a child benefit program, recognizing that, for recipients of the
benefit, the "devil is in the details". Aside from adequacy of the benefit, their concerns
include ensuring that the benefit is responsive to changing circumstances, is simple
and transparent to use, has a meaningful right of appeal and provides benefits for those
who are dependent in reality, not just those who are deemed so by statute. 39
These goals overlap on a number of points, but each group has a different emphasis.
All are concerned with "child poverty" and in providing benefits to all children
regardless of their parents' source of income. However, the groups differ as to how
that should be accomplished. Social policy analysts continue to advocate for the
inclusion of tax principles and share with anti-poverty activists a concern that the
benefit be delivered in a non-intrusive, respectful way. Social policy analysts are
divided over the degree to which the benefit should be aimed at promoting attachment
to the workforce and what that means.
The key choice made by the government was to implement child benefits as an
income-tested monthly benefit to all low income families, delivered through the tax
system. This choice brought some of the advantages of the tax system to the provision
of income support for low income families. However, the institutional constraints
imposed by the tax system also reduced the effectiveness of the benefit in meeting the
objectives of the program. The institutional factors of the tax and social assistance
systems are the subject of the next section.
II. THE INCOME TAX SYSTEM AND THE SOCIAL ASSISTANCE SYSTEM
A. Purpose, Principles and Institutional Framework
Federal child benefits are embedded in the federal income tax system and provincial
child benefits in the social assistance system. Institutional factors influencing the
design features of child benefits under the federal tax system and the provincial social
assistance system are located in the purpose, guiding principles and statutory and
administrative frameworks of each system.
37. C. Freiler & J. Cerny, Benefiting Canada's Children: Perspectives on Gender and Social Responsi-
biliy (Ottawa: Status of Women Canada, 1998) at 13.
38. Battle and Mendelson, supra note 18.
39. National Anti-Poverty Organization, Presentation to the Standing Committee on Finance: Bill C-36
and the National Child Benefit (23 April 1998); Interview with S. Tingley [, National Working
Group on the Child Benefit]. Actual versus deemed dependence occurs when a parent is providing
the necessities of life for a child who is not considered a "dependent" under the statute. See the dis-
cussion on "Eligibility" below for details.
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Four federal departments share responsibility for the tax system. The Finance Depart-
ment is responsible for developing policy and preparing legislation. Human Resources
Development Canada participates in this process when provisions relate to social
policy. Revenue Canada is responsible for the administration of the Act, including
social programs delivered through the Act. Litigation is the responsibility first of
Revenue Canada's Appeals Division and then the Department of Justice. In addition,
all Departments are subject to an audit by the Auditor General.
The Income Tax Act 40 provides the statutory framework for the system. Legislation is
normally introduced through the Budget process, although adjustments are frequently
made through Technical Amendments. In accordance with its complex purposes, it is
a long, complicated and very detailed statute. The ITA is supplemented by comparably
long and complex Regulations. In addition, Revenue Canada publishes a wide variety
of Information Circulars for the public, Interpretation Bulletins on departmental
interpretation of particular provisions, and Technical Notes. Operational policies are
contained in the 218 volumes of Technical Operating Manuals, only a severely edited
version of which is available for viewing by the public at Taxation Centre reading rooms.
The primary purpose of the income tax system is to gather revenue for government.
It is based on the principle that people should share the tax burden in accordance with
their "ability to pay". 41 "Vertical equity" requires that people with more resources
should pay more taxes (progressivity). 42 "Horizontal equity" dictates that people in
similar circumstances should pay similar amounts of tax. This latter principle includes
both treating income the same regardless of source, and recognizing when people are
in "similar" circumstances. 43
The tax system is also used to pursue specific policy objectives. These objectives are
allocational, with respect to investment, growth, the structure of the economy and
regional balance. They are also distributional, delivering benefits to specific demo-
graphic groups including the elderly, the disabled, single parents and children.44 Using
40. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985 (5th Supp.), c.1 [hereinafter ITA].
41. This is not a value-free or simple concept. There is ongoing debate among tax writers about what
constitutes "ability to pay". For example, we define "ability to pay" as "income", not "wealth" which
seriously disadvantages low income earners and women whose assets, if any, are held in income-pro-
ducing investments and who tend to have relatively fewer assets than people of higher income in any
case. See L. Phillips, "Tax Policy and the Gendered Distribution of Wealth" in Bakker, supra note
13, 14.
42. Basing the tax system on the principle of progressivity is increasingly being challenged and watered
down: see N. Brooks, 'The Changing Structure of the Canadian Tax System: Accommodating the
Rich" (1993) 31 Osgoode Hall L.J. 137 at 157-167.
43. Ibid. at 181-84; L. Osberg, "What's Fair? The Problem of Equity in Taxation" in A.M. Maslove, ed.,
Fairness in Taxation: Exploring the Principles (Toronto; University of Toronto Press, 1993) 63 at
69-72.
44. A.M. Maslove, Tax Reform in Canada: the Process and Impact (Halifax: Institute for Research on
Public Policy, 1989) at 13-16; Ontario, Fair Taxation in a Changing World: Report of the Ontario
Fair Tax Commission (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1993) at 35-42.
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the tax system to provide incentives or to realize allocational goals is not revenue
neutral; the concept of "tax expenditure" reflects that providing incentives, tax relief,
benefits and tax deferrals all cost the public money. Over 150 provisions in the tax
system are in fact tax expenditures, ranging from a few million dollars to many billions
of dollars. Although the use of tax expenditures to further policy objectives is now
widely accepted, the practice has been criticized on the basis that it lacks the visibility,
budgetary accountability and democratic debate of direct expenditure programs. 45
The administration of social assistance is considerably less complicated and more
accessible than the ITA. In Ontario, the Ministry of Community and Social Services
(MCSS) has full responsibility for policy development, although with input from the
Provincial Auditor.46 Social assistance is a direct expenditure program. The statutory
framework includes the Ontario Disabilities Support Program Act47 for people who
meet the statutory definition of disabled. Unemployed employable people, single
mothers and those who are unemployable but do not meet the statutory definition of
"disabled"receive benefits under the Ontario Works Act.48 The OWA is administered
by municipalities, who are accountable to the province, and the ODSPA is administered
by the province. Both statutes have extensive regulations. They are also interpreted
by policy manuals, most of which are available to the public. 49
The overarching purpose of a social assistance system is to provide assistance to
people in need. Perceptions of what kind of assistance should be given, and who is in
need, have changed over time, and within a given period are not uniformly shared by
all members of the community. However, certain themes flow through the discourse
and are here identified as principles.
One guiding principle is that people should be deserving of assistance. 50 Historically,
this meant eligibility for those within recognized categories of "deserving poor", that
45. See S.M. Block & A.M. Maslove, "Ontario Tax Expenditures" in A.M. Maslove, ed., Taxes as
Instruments of Public Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) 167. J.R. Kesselman,
"Direct Expenditures versus Tax Expenditures for Economic and Social Policy" in N. Bruce, ed.,
Tax Expenditures and Government Policy: The Seventh John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Eco-
nomic Policy (Kingston, Ont.: Queens' University, 1988) 283; N. Brooks, "Comment" in N. Bruce,
ed., Ibid., 324.
46. Although the Provincial Auditor does not officially have a policy making function, it was his con-
cern with potential leakage in his 1993 Report which led to the introduction of some of the most
intrusive and punitive information requirement practices.
47. Social Assistance Reform Act, S.O. 1997, c.25, Sch.B [hereinafter ODSPA].
48. Ibid., Sch.A. In this paper, I use OWA to denote the statute and OW to mean the Ontario Works pro-
gram.
49. The manual containing the Policy Directives for ODSPA is available online at
http:lwww.gov.on.ca/CSS/pagelbrochurelodspdir.html. It is anticipated that the Policy Directives for
the OWA will be available online at some point in the future.
50. Transitions, supra note 34 at 70. The principles I identify here are common themes arising from the
literature, not principles I necessarily believe should govern a "good" social assistance system. The
principle of "deservedness" is an example of a principle not accepted by all. In 1988, the Ontario
Social Assistance Review Committee's primary recommendation, based on extensive community
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is, the blind, disabled and the elderly. Assistance for unemployed breadwinners, "the
undeserving poor", has always been more complicated, arising from a moral anxiety
that people are on social assistance because of some fault of their own: namely,
laziness, immorality or both. Work tests were imposed to ensure that those receiving
assistance were really willing to work and not just taking advantage of the system. 51
Historically, single mothers occupied some middle ground. Insofar as they conformed
to notions of "a fit and proper person", they were deserving, but they were subject to
constant and vigilant scrutiny of their moral behaviour.52 More recently, the Ontario
Social Assistance Reform Act not only brought in work-for-welfare requirements for
unemployed breadwinners, but took single mothers out of the "deserving poor -
categorically eligible" class and placed them squarely in the "unemployed breadwin-
ner - undeserving poor" class.
53
A second principle is that social assistance should be a program of "last resort". Only
people who have no access to other resources, and whose income and assets are below
an accepted level are eligible for benefits. Further, "the principle of lesser eligibility"
demands that assistance should never be enough to make people financially better off
receiving assistance than they would be working. Finally, there are the principles of
"compassion" and "deterrence", which are inversely related to each other. Periods of
high unemployment when welfare rolls rise are correlated with deterrence policies
which discourage applications and restrict eligibility. Conversely, policies guided by
compassion are more likely to arise when welfare rolls are low.54
While these principles appear to underlie much of the thinking about social assistance
programs historically and up to the present, how they are interpreted and the shape
and impact of the resulting social assistance program varies with many factors,
including the political climate of the day. The Social Assistance Reform Act passed in
1997 clearly reflected the agenda of the Conservative government in power. The
consultation, was to eliminate the difference between deserving and undeserving poor, by basing eli-
gibility entirely on financial need: Ibid. This was not acted on and, by the time new legislation was
proposed almost a decade later, public sentiment fed by concern for the deficit led to widespread
support for a notion of deservedness. See I. Morrison, "Ontario Works: A Preliminary Assessment"
(1998) 13 J. L. Soc. Pol'y 1 at 2-5; A. Moscovitch, "Social Assistance in the New Ontario" in D.
Ralph, A. Regimbald & N. St-Amand, eds., Mike Harris' Ontario: Open for Business, Closed to
People (Halifax: Fernwood: 1997) 80.
51. J. Struthers, Can Workfare Work?: Reflectionsfrom History (Ottawa: Caledon Institute, 1996).
52. Widowed single mothers were recognized as "deserving" first, in 1920 in Ontario. Divorced mothers
were not eligible until 1951, unwed mothers did not become eligible under even limited conditions
until 1956. See M.J.H. Little, "No Car, No Radio, No Liquor Permit": The Moral Regulation of Sin-
gle Mothers in Ontario, 1920-1997 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998); J. Struthers, The Lim-
its of Affluence: Welfare in Ontario, 1920-1970 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) at
19-49.
53. S.O. 1997, c.C-25. This redefinition of single mothers occurred over a period of time: Little, Ibid. at
139-163; P. Evans, "Single Mothers and Ontario's Welfare Policy: Restructuring the Debate" in Bro-
die, supra note 11, 151.
54. Transitions, supra note 33 at 70-71; Struthers, supra note 51 at 7.
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purpose of social assistance programs shifted from the provision of income support
to an employment program with an income support component.
B. "Culture"
This next section deals with culture. By "culture" I mean the set of practices and beliefs
in which the delivery of benefits is embedded. Understanding the culture of the two
delivery systems is critical to evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of using
one or the other to deliver income support. I use culture to include not only the
principles and statutory and administrative frameworks discussed above, which set
the stage, but also concepts of citizenship, democracy and fairness.
People in the tax system are seen and see themselves as rights-bearing citizens. They
are constructed as givers, not takers. They give money and they create jobs. By paying
taxes, citizens are submitting to the transfer of their resources ("hard-earned dollars")
to the government, for the public good. They are therefore surrounded by rights, to
privacy, respect, fairness, openness, and to arrange their affairs to minimize their tax
liabilities. Tax expenditures are not characterized as being given money. Rather, they
are seen as money which is not being taken away from those to whom it belongs. 55
Further, the ability to actually influence the design of the tax system overwhelmingly
belongs to the more advantaged members of society. Wealthy individuals and corpo-
rations employ a legion of tax lawyers, accountants and lobbyists whose principal job
is to minimize the tax liabilities of their clients.56 It is not surprising that their view
of Revenue Canada is as an agency of autocrats with unlimited power, against whom
their clients need protection. 57 The power of this community is reflected in the extent
to which Revenue Canada appears to share this view and puts in place programs and
policies to protect the rights of these wealthy clients.58 It has also become the dominant
view which the public at large shares of Revenue Canada, despite the fact that the
reality ofthe situation is that most individuals' experience with Revenue Canada is
limited to receiving their refund cheque in the mail.
55. P. W. Hogg & J. E. Magee, Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell,
1997) at 469.
56. The power of this group was demonstrated in its ability to seriously water down the progressive rec-
ommendations of the Royal Commission on Taxation (i.e., Carter Commission) in 1966, to com-
pletely derail the 1981 tax reforms proposed in the budget, and to virtually control the agenda of the
1988 tax reforms. See L. McQuaig, Behind Closed Doors (Toronto: Penguin Books, 1987).
57. L. Sossin, "Welfare State Crime in Canada: the Politics of Tax Evasion in the 1980s" (1992) 12
Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 98 at 116; Revenue Canada, Appeals Renewal Initiative: Towards an
Improved Dispute Resolution Process at 1 [hereinafter Appeals Renewal]. See also V. Krishna,
"Rules for Dealing with Revenue Canada" Law Times (29 September 1996) 5. Professor Krishna
describes the "David and Goliath" relationship between taxpayers and Revenue Canada.
58. Appeals Renewal, Ibid.; Revenue Canada, Ensuring Fair Customs and Revenue Administration in
Canada: A Discussion Paper on Progress and an Invitation to Comment (97-262(E)) (March 1998)
[hereinafter Fairness]; Revenue Canada, Fact Sheet: the Fairness Initiative (F980318) (March
1998).
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The highly technical nature of tax policy and administration further limits the ability
of ordinary citizens to participate in policy discussions. It also both contributes to and
is a consequence of the power of the tax community. The opinions of laypersons can
be easily dismissed on the basis that they possess an inaccurate or at least incomplete
understanding of all the technical details. Non-experts may be reluctant to claim a
place in the debate for fear that this is true. Framing the debate on tax policy in
technical terms allows it to appear neutral and outside the political realm, further
discouraging citizen participation and abandoning the field to the "experts". 59
Unlike the citizens imbued with full political, civil and social rights assumed by the
tax system, two types of citizens can be identified in the social assistance system: those
who get benefits, and those who fund them (the taxpayers). 60 People who receive
welfare are not rights-bearing subjects. At best they are objects of charity. Often, they
are seen as quintessential takers and depicted as "welfare bums", "welfare queens"
and "welfare cheats". Many of their rights to social citizenship are suspended,
including their rights to privacy, respect and to make decisions about their lives. They
must prove their honesty, continually fighting a presumption of ineligibility. Initiatives
against welfare fraud and abuse are continually in the news.61
Not only are their social and civil rights restricted, but people who rely on social
assistance are rarely in a position to exercise their political rights to participate
meaningfully in debates about public policy. They are excluded from the corridors of
power, through lack of education, organization and, most of all, money. However, the
social assistance policy making process itself is more accessible to the general public
than tax policy. While the rules and regulations governing welfare law are very
complex, the principles themselves are not technical. Welfare policy is thus highly
susceptible to analysis by anecdote and soundbite. No "experts" are needed to
determine how the social assistance system should be designed and administered.
The difference in the rights of citizenship are apparent in the understanding of
"fairness" in the two systems. "Fairness" in the tax system means two different things.
From the tax policy (Finance) point of view, it means equity: namely, a fair sharing
of the tax burden based on ability to pay. From the administrative (Revenue Canada)
point of view, it means a fair and open process. This goal is reflected in the formal
Declaration of Taxpayer Rights, appended to the General Income Tax Guide and other
Revenue Canada publications. Under the Declaration, taxpayers have the right to:
1) complete and accurate information about the Act, entitlements and obligations;
59. Supra note 12.
60. OWA, supra note 48, s. 1; Morrison, supra note 50 at 42-3. Note that this bears no relation to the real-
ity that many people on welfare paid taxes in the past, will in the future and also do at present
through sales tax, if nothing else. Although there is a Goods and services Tax credit, it does not reim-
burse for all GST paid: Ontario Fair Tax Commission, Working Group Report: Low Income Tax
Relief(Toronto: Ontario Fair Tax Commission, December 1992) at 75.
61. Morrison, supra note 50 at 28-36; I. Morrison, "Rights and the Right: Ending Social Citizenship in
Tory Ontario" in Ralph, Regimbald & St-Armand, supra note 50, 68.
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2) impartial application of the law;
3) courtesy and consideration, whether in a request for information or an audit;
4) be presumed honest, unless there is evidence to the contrary;
5) privacy and confidentiality;
6) impartial review;
7) arrange their affairs to minimize the tax payable, as long as it is in accordance
with the law;
8) know their rights and insist that they be respected.
62
"Fairness" in the context of social assistance has a different focus. Fairness in this
context is defined in light of the concern with "dependency" and employment enhance-
ment. In the "Guiding Principles of [Welfare] Reform" produced by MCSS, fairness
is the first principle:
63
Programs that merely provide financial assistance and do not assist welfare recipi-
ents back into jobs fail to meet the principle of fairness. They let down the people
who need assistance by trapping them in a vicious circle of dependency and skill
loss. They also fail the taxpayers.
There is no Declaration of Social Assistance Recipient Rights equivalent to that for
taxpayers. Although Ontario recipients receive a copy of a very long and detailed
Rights and Responsibilities form at the time of their application for social assistance,
its content and purpose is quite different. The only rights mentioned are the right to
apply for supplementary benefits, the right to written notice of a decision and the right
to appeal a decision affecting a mandatory benefit.64 The remainder of the document
explains their obligations to disclose all income, assets and any material changes of
circumstances. Applicants are required to sign the document and are given a copy. Its
most frequent use is as evidence in social assistance appeals, as proof that recipients
knew and understood their obligations.
The tax system is based on self-declaration and voluntary compliance. It assumes a
high degree of citizen responsibility. 65 The government overtly intrudes only as much
as is necessary to ensure an acceptable degree of compliance. In most cases, docu-
mentation to support claims need not be produced unless specifically requested. 66
62. Revenue Canada, 1997 General Income Tax Guide (5006-G).
63. Ontario, Ministry of Finance, 1998 Ontario Budget Paper F: Making Welfare Work at 172.
64. MCSS, Form 0465. These rights are listed as "chances": for e.g., the chance to file an appeal, and the
"chance to ask" about other benefits.
65. See, for e.g., Fairness, supra note 58 at 4: "In Canada, our revenue and customs administration oper-
ates on the principle of voluntary compliance. Voluntary compliance is based on a fundamental
belief that most Canadians will abide by the law if they have the information, advice, and other ser-
vices necessary to help them meet their obligations".
66. See, for e.g., supra note 62 at 21.
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Even when being reassessed, audited or investigated, "fairness" and the rights of the
taxpayer are paramount. 67
The welfare system is not a self-declaration system. There are extensive information
requirements, all of which must be backed up by the prescribed documentation before
assistance can be issued.68 Applicants must prove eligibility by providing information
on an ongoing basis. Failure to remit a monthly reporting card by the seventh day of
the month can result in delays of several weeks before a cheque can be issued. Social
assistance authorities also have the right and are developing the technology to
implement finger scanning of social assistance recipients. Recipients will be required
to submit to and use this technology to receive ongoing assistance. 69
Taxpayers have a right to arrange their affairs to pay the least possible tax. The
consequence of this right is that tax practitioners spend a great deal of time coming
up with creative ways to minimize tax liabilities. 70 Much of the complexity of the ITA
arises from the government trying to plug loopholes created by tax experts. In an
attempt to fight this more systematically, the government finally enacted the General
Anti-Avoidance Rule.71 Under this rule, transactions which violate the spirit and intent
of the law can be nullified and tax liability imposed. However, no penalties or other
consequences result, other than interest on the amount owed. In fact, taxpayers can
avoid even this modest penalty by asking for an Advanced Tax Ruling on their
proposed transaction. 72
Far from having a right to arrange their affairs to maximize access to benefits, social
assistance recipients are specifically prohibited from doing so. An applicant who
transfers or disposes of assets for the purpose of qualifying for assistance can be found
ineligible for any benefits whatsoever. This also applies to a person who has trans-
ferred or disposed of assets for less than adequate consideration. The welfare admin-
istrator can look at transactions as far back as three years before the date of
application. 73
The tax system assumes that people are honest. The welfare system assumes they are
trying to cheat the system. Nowhere is this difference more clearly illuminated than
in the language and methods of "ensuring compliance". There is "leakage" in both
systems, both because of administrative practices and intentional or unintentional
misreporting by clients. In the Ontario social assistance system in 1998, less than 3%
of cases received more benefits than they were entitled to for reasons the government
67. See Fairness, supra note 58.
68. OWA, supra note 48, s.7(3); 0. Reg. 134/98, s. 14 [hereinafter OWR]; Morrison, supra note 50 at 30.
69. OWA, Ibid., s.74(3).
70. Sossin, supra note 57 at 115.
71. ITA, supra note 40, s.245.
72. Revenue Canada's policy respecting advance rulings and the procedure for obtaining rulings is set
out in Revenue Canada, Information Circular 70-6R3, "Advance Income Tax Rulings" (1996).
73. OWR,supra note 68, s.32.
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considered "fraud or misuse". 74 This resulted in the identification of $63 million worth
of overpayments. The total outstanding recoverable overpayments, for all years
cumulatively, stood at $368 million in 1996. 75 Revenue Canada reports only a 95%
compliance rate in filing, 76 and almost all audits result in money owed to the
government. 77 Its verification and enforcement programs identified an additional $4.8
billion owed to the government in 1995/96 by Canadian taxpayers, over and above
what was reported and self-assessed voluntarily. 78 "Taxpayers" have higher rates of
non-compliance, with much greater impact on public revenue than welfare non-com-
pliance, but attract a much lower degree of moral opprobrium if any at all.79
According to Revenue Canada, the solution to the problem of noncompliance in the
income tax system is to "foster a culture of compliance".80 The first stage of its
compliance strategy is "facilitation", that is, making it easy for taxpayers to comply,
through the provision of user friendly materials and telephone access where neces-
sary.8 1 Another aspect of facilitation is the voluntary disclosure policy. Under this
program, people who have failed to file an income tax return (potentially subject to
both criminal and civil sanctions) or who have made a false statement on their income
tax return, need only voluntarily file or disclose the misrepresentation before Revenue
Canada catches up with them.82 Rather than receiving a sanction, they will be "brought
back into the fold".8 3 There is no comparable procedure for social assistance recipi-
ents, who face potential criminal charges upon voluntary disclosure.
74. The Provincial Auditor reported there were 551,500 social assistance cases, representing 1,095,000
people, at the end of March 1998: Ontario, Provincial Auditor, 1998 Annual Report at 57. MCSS
reported 14,771 cases in which social assistance was reduced or terminated due to "fraud or misuse":
Welfare Fraud Control Report (November 1998).
75. Ontario, Provincial Auditor, 1996 Annual Report (March 1996) at 14. Based on an estimated fraud
rate of 3%, the Provincial Auditor calculated that $100 million was lost to fraud in 1995/96. This
accords with the 1998 results, given that total assistance paid was $5.8 billion in 1995/6 and $4.74
billion in 1997/8: Ibid.
76. Revenue Canada, Compliance: From Vision to Strategy (1997) at 3 [hereinafter Compliance]. It is
not clear whether this is 95% voluntarily filed, or 95% voluntarily filed and estimated their tax cor-
rectly.
77. Supra note 55 at 17.
78. Supra note 76 at 9.
79. These are comparisons between Canada and Ontario loss of revenue - a rough (and probably conser-
vative) estimate that 1/3 of the recovered tax revenue is attributable to Ontario taxpayers still results
in an estimate of $1.2 billion. See also Sossin, supra note 57 at 118-127.
80. Supra note 76 at 59.
81. Ibid. at 4.
82. Revenue Canada, Information Circular 85-1R2, "Voluntary Disclosures" (23 October 1992).
83. Supra note 76 at 7. At 7, it is also stated that, "this policy was introduced for taxpayers who are feel-
ing guilty about evading taxes .... I am not questioning the wisdom of Revenue Canada's approach,
as it is arises from a policy of keeping compliance costs low, but merely contrasting this with OW's
policy.
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Revenue Canada's enforcement mechanism has also recently been redesigned to
"reduce the burden of compliance". 84 The strategy and language is of "risk
assessment" and "risk management". 85 As a result of this analysis, Revenue Canada
has developed a number of programs targeted at "high risk" groups, including
corporations, self-employed people and the underground economy. However, pro-
grams include protocols worked out in part with the tax community to protect the
rights of taxpayers, including procedures to minimize the interruption to business
life.86
This contrasts sharply with the language of "welfare cheaters", "abuse" and "fraud"
used extensively in the context of social assistance. Although both the income tax
system and the welfare system take public referrals of fraud allegations, MCSS has
publicly set up a "Fraud Hot Line". Further, MCSS regularly issues reports on
"Welfare Fraud Control", ensuring that the issue continues to be in the public
consciousness and continues to be framed this way.
87
Tax evasion and welfare fraud are both criminal offences. However, prosecutions are
much more vigorously pursued under the welfare system than the tax system. There
were more criminal investigations for welfare fraud in Ontario in 1997/8 than there
were for income tax fraud in all of Canada.88 The likelihood of going to jail is also
much higher for welfare fraud than for income tax fraud.8 9
The above discussion highlights the institutional advantages of delivering income
support programs through the income tax system rather than the social assistance
system. However, the disadvantages come to light upon examination of the details of
the child benefit programs.
C. Child Benefits
Both the income tax system and the social assistance system contain provisions for
benefits for children. In this section, I describe and compare the design features of the
84. Ibid. at 6.
85. Ibid at 10.
86. Revenue Canada, Information Circular 71-14R3, "The Tax Audit"; RC4067 (3931), "Protocol
Between the Verification, Enforcement and Compliance Research Branch (VECR) and the Appeals
Branch of Revenue Canada" (June 10, 1997) was put into place to assure taxpayers of their access to
an appeal process independent from the original decision makers: Appeals Renewal, supra note 57 at
App.A.
87. Morrison, supra note 50 at 32-33.
88. In 1997/98, Ontario completed 53,452 investigations into alleged welfare fraud and obtained 1,123
welfare fraud convictions, with 623 still under investigation: MCSS, Welfare Fraud Control Report
(November 1998) [http://www.gov.on.ca/CSS/page/brochurelfraudnov98.html]. In 1995/96, Reve-
nue Canada took 2,000 "investigative actions". This figure includes criminal prosecutions, cases
where criminal prosecutions were not pursued but penalties imposed and cases to determine tax pay-
able by persons involved in criminal activity. Just under 600 criminal investigations were completed.
See supra note 76 at 47.
89. Sossin, supra note 57 at 122.
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CCTB under income tax legislation and Ontario's social assistance benefits under the
OWA. While design features are often dismissed as "program details", it is the details
which determine whether a program can meet its objectives. Some program details
can be changed, but others are intricately tied to the system in which they are
embedded. Telling the difference between the two is crucial to any discussion of
delivery of income support programs through one system or another, as only then is
it possible to discern whether a perceived flaw can be fixed or whether the program
is fundamentally incapable of meeting its goals.
Child benefits received under the CCTB provisions of the Income Tax Act and under
the OWA90 differ in several respects: namely, they differ in eligibility requirements,
the methods of establishing eligibility, amount of entitlement, enforcement procedures
and dispute resolution. One major difference is that CCTB benefits are entirely "child
benefits". In contrast, child benefits under the OWA are fully integrated with adult
benefits: recipients receive only one cheque. Benefit units are notionally separated
into "adult" and "dependent" (including both child and adult dependents) only for the
purposes of calculating the amount of entitlement. Even then, the regulations provide
a prescribed amount for a single parent and one child, or two parents and one child,
for example; they do not prescribe how much of that amount each member of the
benefit unit should "get". 9
1
1. Eligibility
Under both the CCTB provisions and OWA, benefits are received on behalf of children
under 18 years old. However, under the OWA, there is an additional requirement that
the child must be in school if she is of school age. Further, if she is sixteen or seventeen
years old, she must also be making "satisfactory progress" in school.92 Accordingly,
some children will be covered by the CCTB but not by the OWA.
Both programs stipulate that only one parent can receive benefits for each child. Under
both programs, the benefits are to be received by the child's "primary caregiver",
provided the child resides with him or her.93 Under the CCTB, there is a rebuttable
presumption that the female parent is the eligible individual. If both parents apply for
the benefit, Revenue Canada makes a determination based on the factors set out in the
ITA.94 The test for "primary caregiver" under the OWA is completely harmonized with
the CCTB. The OWA defines the primary caregiver as the person who receives or is
eligible for the CCTB or, if that test does not apply, the person who has "primary care
and control" of the child, determined by assessing the same factors as those in the ITA.
There is no provision under either statute for situations where both parents share
90. ODSPA, supra note 47, is the same except there are no employment enhancement requirements and asset
rules are much more generous. Benefit levels are also higher.
91. OWR, supra note 68, ss.41-2.
92. ITA, supra note 40, s.122.6; OWR, Ibiai, ss.l(1), 2(3).
93. ITA, Ibid., s. 122.6; OWR, Ibid., s.2(3)(c)ii.
94. Income Tax Regulations, C.R.C., c.945, s.6302.
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custody equally. Revenue Canada's practice is to allow the parents to split the children
if there is more than one child or, if there is not, to allow each parent to receive the
benefit for six months of the year.95 Ontario Works follows suit in such situations.
The programs differ in their treatment of applicants who are new Canadians. While
both grant benefits to applicants who are Canadian citizens, permanent residents and
Convention Refugees whose claims have been determined, eligibility for the CCTB
for people with visitor's or Minister's permits is limited to those who have been in
Canada for at least eighteen months.96 Eligibility is much less restricted under the
OWA. It includes anyone other than tourists, people under deportation orders (except
under specified limited circumstances) and visitors who have not made either a refugee
claim or applied for permanent resident status. 97
Financial eligibility tests differ dramatically. The CCTB is income-tested, based on
the family income reported in the income tax return for the "base taxation year". The
amount of the CCTB for the coming year is determined every July, based on the income
tax return filed in the previous April. Accordingly, the CCTB received from July 1998
to June 1999 is based on taxable income reported for 1997 (the base taxation year).98
Financial eligibility under the OWA is determined by assessing current assets as well
as current income. 99 The recipient cannot have liquid assets worth more than the
prescribed limit (approximately $1500 for a couple with one child).100 A vehicle worth
less than $5000 may be exempt, if it is "necessary". A house used as a principal
residence is also exempt, although the recipient must agree to a lien being put on the
house if she receives assistance for more than a year.101 In addition, the applicant must
have pursued all possible financial resources 10 2 and must agree to reimburse OW if
money is due and owing from some other source. 10 3
There are no other conditions of eligibility for the CCTB. Under the OWA, recipients
and their dependents, if they are not attending school, must agree to participate in
"employment assistance" programs, including workfare.' 04 Benefits are reduced if an
adult quits or is fired from a job for misconduct, or if an adult fails to make reasonable
efforts to seek, accept and maintain employment assistance activities, including
95. Revenue Canada, ARD 95-14 "Child Tax Benefit Taxation Directive" (21 August 1995) at 8.
96. ITA, supra noe 40, s.122.6.
97. OWR, supra note 68, s.6.
98. ITA, supra note 40, s. 122.61.
99. OWA, supra note 48, s.7(3)(b).
100. OWR, supra note 68, s.38(l).
101. Ibid., s.39.
102. Ibid, s.13.
103. OWA, supra note 48, s.13; OWR, Ibid., s.15.
104. OWA, Ibid., s.7(4); OWR, Ibid., s.3.
(1999) 14 Journal of Law and Social Policy
workfare. Benefits for single recipients (without children) are terminated for a three
or six month period for these transgressions.
105
Eligibility and entitlement for both programs depend on "family income", that is,
income of the applicant and his or her spouse. 106 The definitions of "spouse" differ
somewhat. 107 Both define "spouse" as a person of the opposite sex. Both include
legally married couples who are cohabiting, and parents of a child who are cohabiting.
However, under the ITA, a person does not become a "spouse" until he or she has
cohabited with the applicant for at least 12 months. Under the OWA, a person becomes
a "spouse" immediately upon cohabitation.
"Cohabitation" is a legal term, extensively interpreted in the common law to include
economic, social, familial and sexual factors which add up to a "marriage-like
relationship"' 0 8 Under both statutes, cohabitation requires more than co-residence.
However, in practice, both Revenue Canada and Ontario Works appear to treat
co-residence as tantamount to cohabitation. Revenue Canada achieves this with its
forms. The General Income Tax Guide and the Child Tax Benefit Application Form
both advise taxfilers that a "spouse" is someone who has lived with them "in a common
law relationship" for twelve months or someone with whom they have a child.109 The
OWA reaches the same result through a presumption that co-residents are spouses
which is very difficult to rebut in practice. 01
2. Entitlement
Once eligibility is determined, the amount of the CCTB is calculated based on a
formula set out in the ITA. I1' Understanding the formula is important to an understand-
ing of how the federal benefit is integrated with the provincial one. Its complexity
highlights the difficulty many recipients have in determining whether they are receiv-
105. OWA, Ibid., s.14; OWR, Ibid., ss.33-34.
106. ITA, supra note 40, s.122.61(l); OWA, Ibid, s.1; OWR, Ibid, ss.l, 40.
107. ITA, Ibid, ss.122.6, 252(3), 252(4); OWR, Ibid., s.1.
108. Re Warwick & Ontario (Minister of Community and Social Services) (1978) 21 O.R. (2d) 528 at 537,
91 D.L.R. (3d) 131, 5 R.F.L. (2d) 325 (C.A.). In Milot v. R. (1995), [1996] 1 C.T.C. 2247 (T.C.C.),
the Tax Court used a "cohabitation questionnaire" approach adopted from the case law to determine
whether the appellant was cohabiting with a spouse for the purposes of calculating entitlement to
credits. They looked at sexual relations, emotional and intellectual exchange, financial support and
common knowledge, as well as sharing household duties and responsibilities. However, in Bolduc c.
R. (1994), [1996] 1 C.T.C. 2113 (T.C.C.), the Court concluded that the appellant was "clearly" a de
facto spouse, despite her evidence that she and her co-resident each paid their share of food, housing
and electricity expenses and that he had no authority over or financial responsibility for her children.
It is not clear what the basis of the decision was, except a shared address and the fact that she had
referred to herself as a de facto spouse on her income tax return. It should also be noted that, because
of a history of highly intrusive, and often abusive, investigation techniques, sexual factors are specif-
ically excluded from consideration by OWR, supra note 68, s. 1(2).
109. Supra note 62 at 10; Revenue Canada, "Child Tax Benefit Application Form" (RC66 E) (1998).
110. OWR, supra note 68, s.l(3).
111. Supra note 40, s.122.61.
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ing the correct amount. The CCTB is made up of two notional parts: the base amount
and the supplement.
The base amount starts with $1020 per year per child, with an extra $75 for each child
in excess of two. There is a further $213 for each child under the age of seven years.
If a child care expense deduction has been claimed for a child under seven, 25% of
the amount claimed as child care expenses must be subtracted from the $213. The
maximum base benefit is therefore $1233 per year or $103 monthly, for a child under
seven.
The amount of the supplement depends on the number of children, with a maximum
of $605 per year for the first child, $405 for the second and $330 per child for the third
and subsequent children. The maximum benefit, including base and supplement, for
a child under seven is $1838 per year or $153 monthly.
The calculation of entitlement under the OWA is also complex. The calculation is
prescribed by Regulation. The amount depends on the difference between the "budg-
etary requirements" of the benefit unit and its income. 112 The "budgetary require-
ments" are prescribed and depend on the number of adults and the number and ages
of children. "Budgetary requirements" are the sum of a prescribed amount for basic
needs 113 and for actual shelter costs up to a maximum prescribed amount. 114 For a
single mother with one child under twelve years, the prescribed "basic needs" are $446
per month, and the maximum amount for shelter is $511. A single person is entitled
to $195 per month for basic needs, and up to $325 per month for shelter costs.
Since both benefits are targeted, both programs contain provisions for the reduction
of the benefits if other income exceeds a threshold amount. However, they differ
dramatically in what is considered "income", the threshold amounts above which the
benefit is reduced and the tax back rates. The CCTB is based on net income, after
deductions for RRSP, professional dues, tuition, support payments, business invest-
ment losses, carrying charges, employment expenses, exploration and development
expenses and any other deductions the taxfiler may be eligible for under the ITA. 115
For Ontario Works, there are less deductions and the definition of "income" is much
broader. It includes not only all income received "by or on behalf of or for the benefit
of' a member of the benefit unit, but also the monetary value of items and services
received and income deemed to be available to the recipient. 116 The treatment of the
112. OWR, supra note 68, s.40.
113. Ibid.,s.41.
114. Ibid., s.42.
115. ITA, supra note 40, s.122.6: The only difference between "net income", the calculation of which
makes up the substantive part of the ITA, and the "adjusted income" used for CCTB purposes is the
exclusion of income received from the involuntary transfer of property, such as foreclosures and sei-
zures of property.
116. OWR, supra note 68, ss.48-54. A few items are specifically exempted from income under the OWA,
including amounts for pain and suffering up to $25,000, and charitable donations.
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CCTB under the OWA is anomalous: the base amount is exempt, while the supplement
is included in income. 117
Income up to $20,921 has no effect on the amount of the CCTB supplement. Above
that threshold amount, the amount of the supplement is reduced by a percentage of the
amount by which the income exceeds $20,921. The rate of reduction varies with the
number of children, from a 12.1% reduction for families with one child up to a 26.8%
reduction for families with more than two children. The base amount of the CCTB has
a threshold of $25,921. The base amount is reduced by 2.5% for each dollar in excess
of $25,921 if there is one child, and by a total of 5% if there are two or more children.
The calculations are simpler under the OWR. Almost all income is deducted dollar for
dollar or, in other words, the tax back rate is 100%. However, the tax back rate for
earned income is lower. The rules governing earned income are very complicated, with
different rates for applicants and recipients, which vary depending on family structure,
the number of children and the number of years the person has been in receipt of social
assistance. 118 That said, the tax back rates under the OWR are always well in excess
of the tax back rates for the CCTB under the ITA.
Benefits are not fully indexed under either the CCTB provisions of the ITA or under
the OWA. The CCTB is partially indexed, with the amount of the benefit increasing
to the extent that inflation exceeds 3% in a given year.119 Thus, for example, if inflation
is 4% in a given year, the benefit will increase by 1% for that year, but will lose 3%
of its value due to inflation. Benefits under the OWA are not indexed to inflation at all.
Consequently, each year the value of the benefit is eroded by the amount of inflation.
Another major difference is the range of benefits available under each program.
Entitlement for CCTB recipients is limited to the amount of the benefit received, with
no other benefits available. OW recipients, however, may be eligible for employment
and training start-up assistance ($253 per year) and up-front child care costs to a
maximum amount, in addition to basic financial assistance. Drug benefits, diabetic
supplies, surgical supplies and dressings and transportation for medical appointments
are also available for all members of the benefit unit. There are also additional benefits
for dependent children: dental and vision services, a winter clothing allowance ($105
per year) and a back to school benefit ($69 to $128 per year). 120
3. Establishing and Maintaining Eligibility
The application procedure for the CCTB is comparatively simple. A completed
Application form, signed by both the applicant and spouse, and completed income tax
returns for both for the relevant base taxation years are all that is required for most
applications. Proof of birth, immigration documentation and Statements of World
Income are also required under limited circumstances. Aside from filing annual
117. lbid,s.54.1.
118. lbid, s.49.
119. ITA, supra note 40, s.122.62(3).
120. OWR, supra note 68, s.55.
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income tax returns, there are no obligations to provide further information to Revenue
Canada unless there is a change affecting the recipient's status as an "eligible
individual". 12
1
In keeping with the detailed eligibility requirements under the OWA, the application
procedure for benefits contains very specific and detailed information requirements
which must be met before eligibility can be established. This includes the requirement
to produce extensive documentation in order to verify the personal and financial
circumstances of all members of the benefit unit. In areas where biometric (finger)
scanning is in operation, the applicant must "agree" to this. 122 Applicants and recipi-
ents must also sign very broad "consent" forms to allow the welfare authority to
request information relevant to eligibility from any source possessing information. 123
Failure to comply with any of these requests can result in refusal or cancellation of
benefits. 124
Ontario Works recipients also have monthly reporting requirements to maintain
ongoing eligibility. In addition, they must advise OW of any material changes in their
circumstances, including family composition, accommodation, earnings, income and
assets. 125 The OWA mandates random home visits to ensure ongoing eligibility and
failure to allow entrance, except under limited circumstances, can result in the loss of
benefits. 126 Recipients and dependent adults are required to sign Participation Agree-
ments, in which they agree to participate in specific planned employment assistance
activities, and must meet regularly with workers to discuss their compliance with this
"Agreement". 127
Applications are potentially processed much faster under the social assistance system
than the income tax system, in keeping with its role as a program of last resort.
Applications for the CCTB take at least two months and may take much longer if
information is missing. If there are two applications for a particular child, the process
may take several months or even years to resolve and no benefits will be issued until
eligibility is determined. 128 Emergency assistance under the OWA may be issued
121. Revenue Canada,"Your Canada Child Tax Benefit" (T4114(E)) (October 1998).
122. OWA, supra note 48, s.7(3)(c); OWR, supra note 68, s.14. For a discussion of finger scanning's use
as a further step in the 'criminalization' of socialassistance recipients and its actual weakness as a
means of detecting criminal activity, see Morrison, supra note 50 at 31-32.
123. OWR, Ibid., s.19.
124. IbidL, s.14.
125. IbiL
126. bid', s.12. OWA, supra note 48, s.7.
127. OWA, Ibid, s.7; OWR, Ibid, ss.3, 25-29.
128. Both applicants are sent a "Care and Upbringing Questionnaire" and given 30 days to complete it. If
one of the applicants does not return the questionnaire within 30 days, they are given an extra 15 day
grace period before reinstatement of benefits occurs. If both questionnaires are returned, they are
assessed by an analyst and a decision rendered. If the analyst cannot make a decision (for e.g., in a
shared custody situation with equal access), the analyst writes to the applicants outlining the possible
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almost immediately upon application and applications for regular benefits should take
only a few days to process if the applicant is able to supply all requested information.
In practice, applications often take much longer than this, given the amount of
documentation currently required.
4. Responding to Changes in Circumstances
Benefits under the CCTB provisions are much less responsive to changes in circum-
stances than social assistance benefits. The CCTB can be adjusted to accommodate
changes in family composition within a benefit year, but not changes in income. 129
When a child is added or leaves, the CCTB formula is recalculated based on the new
information about that child. When a spouse dies, the adjusted income is recalculated
based only on the applicant's income in the base taxation year. The same recalculation
is used when spouses separate, but only after the separation has lasted continuously
for at least ninety days. 130 Benefits are adjusted by completing a form, advising of the
change. The benefit can be adjusted to include a new spouse's income, but there is no
requirement to do so until the next income tax return is filed.
Adjusting the benefit for changes in family composition only requires a recalculation
of the basic formula for the CCTB, using information already provided in the income
tax returns of the base taxation year. No similar mechanism exists for adjusting
eligibility or entitlement for changes in income within the benefit year. Thus, a
recipient who loses a job, or whose cohabiting spouse loses a job, must wait until the
following year or even the next before it is reflected in the CCTB. For example, the
impact on family income of losing a job in late fall of 1998 may not show up until
1999. And the CCTB will not be adjusted to compensate for this until July 2000,
eighteen months later. On the other hand, those whose income increases will not see
their CCTB adjusted downwards for several months, essentially giving them a
"bonus".
Because social assistance is based on current income and regular reporting is built into
the program, it can be much more responsive to changed circumstances. Under the
OWA, benefits can be adjusted immediately not only for the addition or loss of a child
or spouse, but also for a change in income due to unemployment or any other reason.
In addition, as a local social service agency, OW is in a position to make appropriate
referrals to other community agencies for supplemental assistance (food banks,
clothing and special items), a function which is clearly beyond the purview of Revenue
Canada.
alternatives and attempts to resolve the situation (Interview with M. Neal (29 September 1998). Ms.
Neal is in the Eligibility Division, Child Tax Benefit Section, Revenue Canada.). Clearly, such a pro-
cess can take several months. If it is not resolved administratively, the formal dispute resolution pro-
cess can take months or years.
129. ITA, supra note 40, s.122.62.
130. Ibid., s.122.62(6).
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5. Overpayments and Underpayments
Underpayments occur when information which is relevant to eligibility and entitle-
ment has not been reported or considered, and they arise under both the ITA and the
OWA. Underpayments are adjusted through retroactive payments. Under the ITA, an
eligible individual may claim benefits, including an increase in benefits, up to eleven
months retroactively.131 Repayment under OW is much less generous, and entitlement
will not be adjusted more than one month retroactively except under exceptional
circumstances. 132
Overpayments arise when benefits are paid to which the person is not entitled for
whatever reason. While some occur because the recipient delayed in notifying the
authorities of relevant information, some also occur because of systemic or delivery
agent error, resulting in a delay in processing. Overpayments also arise following a
reassessment of the income tax return of either the eligible individual or her spouse,
if the taxable income on which the amount of the CCTB changes. If the spouse fails
to report income for the base taxation year, and then is audited and reassessed, this
will result in an overpayment being assessed for the CCTB, even if the parties have
since separated.
Under both the ITA and the OWA, overpayments are collected from recipients by
deductions from subsequent benefit cheques. The ITA contains legislative authority to
withhold the entire amount of the overpayment, but in practice a maximum of 50% is
withheld in most circumstances. The CCTB cannot be seized, garnished or in any other
manner attached except by Revenue Canada for the purpose of repaying a CCTB
overpayment. 133 Under the OWA, overpayments are recoverable by monthly deduc-
tions of up to 10% of the amount of the benefits. However, while there is a general
proscription against garnishment or attachment, deductions of up to 10% of the
benefits in total may be taken as repayments for a number of debts to the Crown, as
well as for Family Support orders. 134 Both statutes also impose joint and several
liability on recipients and their cohabiting spouses for overpayments which arise
during the period of their cohabitation. 135
6. Disputes
CCTB recipients who object to a decision concerning their benefits must use the appeal
procedures under the ITA. 136 If the dispute cannot be resolved at the first level of
review, the appeal proceeds to the Tax Court of Canada. The Tax Court is a specialized,
statutory court whose mandate is to hear appeals from all decisions under the ITA and
131. Ibid., s.122.62(l).
132. This is current policy. Benefits can be paid retroactively if the fact that the change was not made in a
timely fashion was beyond the control of the recipient.
133. ITA, supra note 40, ss.164(2), 164(2.2).
134. OWA, supra note 48, s.20; OWR, supra note 68, s.62.
135. ITA, supra note 40, s.160.1(2.1); OWA, Ibid., s.21.
136. ITA, Ibid, ss.165-180.
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other statutes which specifically refer to the Tax Court. 137 Appeals may proceed under
either the General or the Informal procedure set out in the Rules.138 Most CCTB
disputes proceed under the Informal Procedures. While still a formal court hearing,
the rules of evidence are relaxed to accommodate unrepresented appellants and there
are statutory timelines. However, decisions under the Informal Procedure have no
precedential value and there is no right of appeal from them.
Despite statutory timelines, a dispute in Tax Court may take several months or even
years to reach resolution. This is particularly true if the Tax Court must travel outside
Toronto or Ottawa, to accommodate an appellant. There is no provision for interim
relief, and Revenue Canada's decision stands until the Tax Court rules otherwise. In
the case of disputes over who is the eligible individual (which comprise the majority
of CCTB cases which reach the Tax Court), benefits are suspended until a determina-
tion is made.
The appeal procedure under the OWA is much less formal than even the Informal
Procedure under the Tax Court of Canada Rules. Following an initial internal review
of the decision by the local welfare administrator, unresolved disputes proceed to the
Social Benefits Tribunal (SBT). 139 Hearings are governed by the Statutory Powers
and Procedures Act' 40 and the rules of the SBT. The rules of evidence and the conduct
of the hearing are comparatively relaxed. Not all decisions under the social welfare
legislation are appealable, but there is a right of appeal for decisions on eligibility and
entitlement for basic assistance, unless the Tribunal decides that they are "frivolous
and vexatious".141 The Tribunal has limited jurisdiction and cannot consider either
constitutional or ultra vires arguments. 142 There is a right of further appeal to the
Ontario Court (General Division) (Divisional Court) on matters of law.1
43
The SBT is much more accessible than the Tax Court. It travels regularly to centres
around the province and hearings may also be conducted by telephone or as a paper
review. Although there may still be lengthy delays, especially in outlying areas, the
procedure is speedier than Tax Court. In recognition that people on social assistance
137. Tax Court of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-2, s. 12. The other statutes include: Canada Pension Plan,
R.S.C. 1985, c.C-8; Cultural Property Export and Import Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-51; Employment
Insurance Act, supra note 7; Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.E-15; Old Age Security Act, R.S.C.
1985, c.0-9; Petroleum and Gas Revenue Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.P-12; War Veterans Allowance
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.W-3; Merchant Navy Veteran and Civilian War-related Benefits Act, R.S.C.
1985, c.C-31.
138. Tax Court of Canada Rules (General Procedure); Tax Court of Canada Rules (Informal Procedure),
S.O.RJ90-688.
139. OWA, supra note 48, ss.27-28.
140. R.S.O. 1990, c.S.22.
141. OWA, supra note 48, ss.26, 33.
142. Ibid., s.67(2).
143. Ibid., s.36(1).
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often cannot wait for a hearing, the SBT may order interim assistance, although this
must be repaid if the appellant loses the case or fails to appear.144
7. Compliance and Enforcement
The ITA and OWA share similar investigation and enforcement powers, but there are
significant differences in how these powers are used. Both statutes grant broad powers
to their authorized investigators, including the right to enter into any place that they
reasonably suspect contains information relevant to the investigation, and to demand
production of the books, financial transactions or any documents which may be
relevant.1 45 Investigators also have the power to enter a residence, but must obtain
either the occupant's consent or a search warrant prior to entry.146 People are required
to cooperate with investigations under both statutes, and it is an offence to interfere
with or obstruct investigations. 147 In addition, under the ITA, hearings officers may be
authorized to hold inquiries into "anything relating to the administration or enforce-
ment" of the ITA and have the power to subpoena witnesses and demand the production
of documents. 148
The offence provisions under each statute parallel each other, but those under the ITA
are much more complex, reflecting the complexity of the ITA and the sophistication
of those caught by it. For example, while it is an offence under both statutes to
knowingly make false statements or omissions, under the ITA it is also an offence to
make a false statement "under circumstances amounting to gross negligence", as is
"making, participating in, assenting to or acquiescing in" the making of a false
statement. Under both statutes it is an offence to knowingly obtain or receive benefits
to which one is not entitled, and to aid and abet someone else in so doing. 149 One major
difference is that it is an offence under the ITA to fail to file an income tax return when
required, either because tax is payable or because the Minister demands that one be
filed. 150 While this section reflects the fact that the ITA collects taxes in addition to
distributing benefits, there is nothing to stop it from being used to force a cohabiting
spouse to file an income tax return to enable an applicant to receive the CCTB.
The ITA allows for the imposition of administrative penalties for offences, in addition
to recovery of tax payable or benefits issued.15 1 There is no analogue to administrative
penalties under the OWA, although prosecution under the Provincial Offences Act may
result in a fine up of to $5000, in addition to six months imprisonment.
152
144. Ibid., ss.30, 32.
145. ITA, supra note 40, s.23 1; OWR, supra note 68, s.65.
146. ITA, Ibid., s.231(2); OWR, Ibid., s.65(11).
147. ITA s. 231.5(2); OWA s. 79(3).
148. ITA, Ibid., s.231.4.
149. Ibid., s.239; OWA, supra note 48, s.79(3).
150. ITA, Ibid., ss.162(l), 238(1).
151. Ibid., ss.162-163.1.
152. OWA, supra note 48, s.79.
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The ITA provides for prosecution under the Criminal Code for offences relating to tax
evasion or fraudulent receipt of benefits. 53 Welfare fraud charges may also proceed
under the Criminal Code and historically have. However, with the new and increased
powers given to Eligibility Review Officers under the OWA, an increase in prosecu-
tions under both the Criminal Code and the Provincial Offences Act for welfare fraud
is expected. 154
Although the enforcement provisions under the ITA are in fact stronger than those
under the OWA, they are used very differently. For example, when the Auditor General
discovered that more children were being enrolled in the child benefit program than
were actually eligible and that deaths of children were not being reported,155 Revenue
Canada's response was to enter into negotiations with all provinces so that it would
begin to receive birth and death records on an ongoing basis.1 56 Similar concerns
expressed by the Provincial Auditor led to widespread anxiety about welfare fraud and
abuse and increased investigations into individual cases. 157 The institutional frame-
works of both programs contemplate regular and vigorous enforcement, but only under
the OWA does the political will exist to carry it out.
This apparently more relaxed and less punitive approach to compliance under the ITA
may in fact be shortlived. The CCTB is one of the single most expensive tax
expenditure programs under the ITA, with over five billion dollars being paid out in
benefits every year.158 As a portent of this trend, the Auditor General recently
recommended periodic reconfirmation of eligibility information after it was discov-
ered that 0.8% of child tax benefit applications reported marital status in a manner that
was inconsistent to that reported on previously submitted tax returns.' 59 The Auditor
General's 1996 Report recommended that Revenue Canada consider adopting similar
approaches to those used by provincial social assistance administrations in order to
protect against fraud and abuse. 160 In response to this recommendation, among other
things, Revenue Canada agreed to develop "effective, targeted verification and
enforcement activities." 61
This brief look at the program details of the child benefit programs under both the
income tax and social assistance systems illustrates the differences between a program
153. ITA, supra note 40, ss.238-239. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-46, as am.
154. OWA, supra note 48, s.58; OWR, supra note 68, s.65. Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.P.33,
as am.
155. Canada, Auditor General, 1996 Report at 15-17.
156. Revenue Canada, Benefit Programs Report (RC4071) at 14. Following this, the 1996-7 Benefit
Report reported very few discrepancies.
157. Ontario, Provincial Auditor, 1992 Report.
158. Supra note 156 at 7.
159. Supra note 155 at 18.
160. Ibid. at 22-23.
161. Ibid. at 29.
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superimposed on an existing structure designed to serve many purposes, such as the
income tax system, and one that is designed for one specific purpose, such as social
assistance. While in the current political climate the tax system has the advantage of
less punitive monitoring and enforcement practices, the social assistance system can
be much more responsive and flexible in meeting the needs of low income recipients.
D. Integrating the Benefits
Up until now, the income tax and social assistance systems have been examined
separately. However, one of the main features of the National Child Benefit is the
integration of provincial social assistance benefits with federal child tax benefits. This
next section therefore looks at the relationship between the benefit programs. It also
raises questions about the impact of the interaction of the OWA with the design of the
CCTB on those who must rely on both for income support.
The first integrated child benefit was introduced in British Columbia under the B.C.
Family Bonus program in 1996. Under that program, an income tested benefit of up
to $103 per month was added to the former federal Child Tax Benefit and delivered
through the tax system. Social assistance rates were reduced to reflect the fact that
child benefits were now received under the new program. Families received social
assistance only for the adults in the benefit unit and for children who were not eligible
for the B.C. Family Bonus. Those who were eligible but did not receive the full amount
of the child benefit received a top-up from their social assistance program, B.C.
Benefits. 62 British Columbia has continued this delivery model under the CCTB.
Ontario's model for integrating the CCTB with benefits under the OWA is slightly
different. All eligible families in Ontario continue to receive the CCTB cheque directly
from the federal government. For families receiving social assistance, the supplement
portion of the CCTB is then treated as "income" under the OWA and deducted
dollar-for-dollar from the amount of social assistance benefits.' 63
Neither system of integration is perfect. The British Columbia model may be more
conceptually satisfying to some because it removes children's benefits entirely from
the welfare system, however it is potentially less responsive to changes in the CCTB
than the Ontario system. Under an information sharing agreement with the federal
government, Ontario is advised by the twentieth day of the month how much CCTB
should be deducted from social assistance benefits for the following month. If the
amount of the CCTB decreases, the province automatically compensates by topping
up the social assistance benefit, so that the total amount of monthly income received
remains the same. If the CCTB is reduced because of a previous overpayment of the
benefit, OW may collect the money through an overpayment deduction, but the
162. B.C. Benefits Manual at 10.10 (5 November 1998) [http://www.mhr.gov.bc.ca/publicat/violl/10-
10.htm].
163. MCSS, "Memo re The New National Child Benefit Initiative and Its Impact on FBA and GWA
Social Assistance Programs" (12 March 1998).
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deduction will be limited to a maximum of 10%, not the 50 to 100% allowed by
Revenue Canada. 16
4
The first and most obvious way that the OWA and CCTB rules interact is that families
receiving social assistance receive no financial benefit from the CCTB supplement.
The supplement is clawed back entirely. Not only does this mean that the supplement
does nothing to alleviate child poverty for the "poorest of the poor", but it also means
that some families who would otherwise qualify for social assistance no longer do.
Approximately 1,700 families lost all eligibility to social assistance in Ontario when
the NCB was introduced in July 1998 because of the combined effects of earned
income, other income and the CCTB supplement. 165 Although the net income of these
families has not changed, the fact that they now receive a portion of that income from
the tax (as opposed to the social assistance) system means that they are actually worse
off following the introduction of the NCB. They are worse off because they will no
longer be eligible for supplementary and in-kind benefits. The clawback applies to all
people receiving social assistance, including families with earned income. 166 The
result is that only low income families who do not rely on social assistance for any
part of their income will benefit from the CCTB. The number affected is significant.
The National Council of Welfare estimates that only 36% of poor families and only
17% of poor single-mother-led families are actually receiving a net benefit from the
enriched CCTB. 167
For those Ontario families who continue to receive social assistance, integration does
not free them from the information and behavioural requirements of the OWA, but
simply adds another obligation. The OWA requirement to realize any financial resource
includes the CCTB, and social assistance benefits may be canceled or reduced if the
recipient does not apply for the CCTB. 168 As a result, people on social assistance do
164. Ibid. at 4-8. Ontario's system of integration has not been without problems. The amount deducted is
calculated by the province on the basis of a payroll sheet received from the federal government each
month, which contains information on how much was remitted and for which children for each eligi-
ble family on social assistance. In cases where the information is wrong, the province takes the posi-
tion that it is bound by the federal information, and the recipient must go through the ITA system to
resolve it.
165. Interview with J. Stapleton. Mr. Stapleton is a Senior Policy Advisor, MCSS.
166. Nationally, the National Council of Welfare reported that in March 1997 36% of two-adult families
on social assistance had earned income and 19% of single mother led families on social assistance
had earned income (National Council of Welfare, Profiles of Welfare: Myths and Realities (Ottawa:
Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 1998) [hereinafter Profiles] at 48).
167. National Council of Welfare, Child Benefits: Kids Are Still Hungry (Ottawa: Minister of Public
Works and Government Services, 1998) at 9 [hereinafter Kids]. Single mothers also have their
CCTB clawed back for longer periods of time, as they face more labour market barriers and rely on
social assistance for longer than other recipients (Ibid., Profiles at 27). Seventy-five per cent of the
315,500 children who were beneficiaries of Ontario social assistance in January 1999 were in single
mother led families (excluding children whose parents received ODSPA) (MCSS, News Release,
"First Time Ever: 12 Consecutive Months of People Leaving Welfare" (5 February 1999)).
168. OWR, supra note 68, s.13(1).
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not just have the right to apply for the CCTB: they are required to do so. As applications
require filing income tax returns, this imposes an obligation on both the applicant and
her cohabiting spouse to file income tax returns. For other citizens (i.e., those not in
receipt of social assistance), income tax returns are only mandatory if tax is owed or
the Minister requests that a return be filed.
The rules determining who receives the benefit for the purposes of the CCTB and the
OWA are different. Although in most cases, children who are considered beneficiaries
under the ITA are also beneficiaries under the OWA, there are cases where they are
not. Families in which no one meets the immigration status requirements of the ITA
might still be eligible for benefits under the OWA. Conversely, a sixteen or seventeen
year old who is not attending school or is not making satisfactory progress in school
will not be eligible for benefits under the OWA, but would still be a beneficiary of the
CCTB, provided he or she still resided with a "primary caregiver". The CCTB
supplement for that child would not be deducted from the recipient's social assistance
allowance as no social assistance benefits are received for him or her. In this limited
case, the enriched CCTB does indeed provide an improvement in the financial
well-being of families relying on social assistance because they at least receive the
CCTB supplement for the child rather than no benefits at all.
Since the enactment of the OWA, the treatment of joint custody situations for CCTB
and OWA purposes has been completely harmonized. If parents have decided that one
parent should receive the CCTB, then that parent receives both the CCTB and social
assistance benefits for the child even if custody is shared equally. If the parents decide
that one parent should receive the CCTB benefit for six months of the year and the
other parent should receive the CCTB benefit for the other six months of the year, then
social assistance benefits will also be shared six months and six months.
While harmonizing provincial and federal benefits may be intellectually satisfying
and certainly administratively easy, it is potentially disastrous for the family. It
essentially prevents parents likely to be in long term need of social assistance (disabled
or single parents) from having joint custody of their children. Caring for a child under
a joint custody arrangement with shared access will be more expensive than sole
custody because of the necessity of maintaining two homes for the child for the entire
year. Although for six months of the year each parent will not receive any benefits for
the child, they will still have to pay accommodation costs, as well as food and other
necessaries, for the child. Although the parent in receipt of the benefits for a given
period could voluntarily share those benefits with the other parent, the only recourse
if they refuse to do so is to go back to family court to try to have the joint custody
situation changed or to appeal under the ITA. This raises the spectre of the use of
benefits'as a weapon to control the other parent.
Because of the broader definition of spouse under Ontario social assistance legislation,
more co-residents are considered cohabiting spouses under Ontario social assistance
law than under the ITA. While subjecting social assistance recipients to a broader
definition of "spouse" than applies to people who are not in receipt of social assistance
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is prima facie unfair, the CCTB provisions do not make this worse. In certain
circumstances, however, a person will be a "spouse" for the purposes of the ITA and
not for social assistance. This occurs when the spouses have separated, but the
separation has not yet lasted ninety days. After ninety days, the recipient can apply for
an adjustment to the CCTB, that is, to have the CCTB based only on her previous
income, rather than on their joint income. In these circumstances, the CCTB supple-
ment amount will be deducted dollar-for-dollar from social assistance benefits, how-
ever the base amount will remain low for the initial ninety day period and will not be
compensated for by the social assistance system.
An attempt was made by the MCSS to develop policies to alleviate hardship for social
assistance recipients caused by differing rules with respect to underpayments and
overpayments of the CCTB. Overpayments of the CCTB, recoverable at 50-100%
under ITA rules, are paid by the social assistance authority to Revenue Canada on
behalf of social assistance recipients. This repayment is then treated as an overpayment
under social assistance law 169 and may be recovered by the social assistance authority
from the recipient under the usual recovery proceedings. If a CCTB recipient receives
a lump sum repayment of an underpayment from Revenue Canada, the portion of that
CCTB attributable to the supplement is considered "income" in the month in which it
is received and deducted dollar-for-dollar from the social assistance benefit cheque.
170
For some recipients, having income from two different sources will mean that at least
some money is coming in from somewhere, to cushion the impact of problems with
the receipt of the other benefits. For example, if a social assistance cheque is suspended
while the recipient attempts to supply requested information or prove that a co-resident
is not a "spouse", then at least the family can rely on the CCTB. However, for others,
two delivery agents can mean twice as many hurdles to income security.
In addition to the administrative problems of integrating the system discussed above,
there are legal problems which arise from harmonizing the two statutes. Because of
the harmonization of the definitions, the province is now bound by the determination
made by Revenue Canada as to who meets the definition of "primary caregiver" in
joint custody situations. 17 1 A recipient who disagrees with this determination must
appeal under the ITA. For many recipients, the physical and emotional inaccessibility
of this forum will mean no effective right of appeal.
169. Ibid., as am. by 0. Reg. 272/98, s.9.
170. Ibid., s.6.
171. This results entirely from the harmonization of the definitions, as there is nothing to prevent a prov-
ince from adopting its own conditions of eligibility, as was the case under the predecessor statutes to
the OWA and the ODSPA, the Family Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.F.2, and the General Welfare
Assistance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.G.6.
The Canada Child Tax Benefit
III. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF USING THE TAX SYSTEM
TO DELIVER AN INTEGRATED INCOME SUPPORT BENEFIT FOR
CHILDREN
The relative advantages and disadvantages to using the income tax system as opposed
to a direct delivery program such as social assistance result from both institutional
factors and political choices within those institutional frameworks. The two are
sometimes, but not always, interrelated.
A. Reduced Stigma
One of the major advantages to the use of the income tax system is the lack of stigma
attached to it. This lack of stigma is due in part to the relative anonymity of the
application process, 172 but also to the near universality of the CCTB program which
gives it the character of a social right rather than charity. This is vastly different from
the welfare system, where mere receipt is sufficient to stigmatize all members of the
family.
The lack of stigma also arises from the culture of the tax system itself, as tax
expenditures in general are perceived as rewards for socially desirable activity. As
Canadians, we accept that one of the functions of the tax system is to redistribute
income through programs such as the CCTB. Targeting the benefit at families with
children meshes with the accepted tax objective of horizontal equity, even though the
income test and exclusion of high income families from receipt subverts this objective
in fact. The CCTB also contributes to a sense of fairness in the tax system: corporations
get tax breaks, rich people get tax breaks and so do ordinary people through the CCTB.
Recipients of the CCTB are seen as "taxpayers" with entitlement to child benefits
not as recipients of charity.
B. Reduced Intrusiveness
The delivery of the CCTB through the tax system is less intrusive than delivery through
the social assistance system. This is in part due to the test for the benefit, rather than
to the systems involved. Because the CCTB is income-tested, no special information
is required beyond that required of any taxfiler, other than the inclusion of spousal
income. A means test, as in social assistance programs, requires information about all
other sources of potential and deemed income, as well as all assets.
The use of an income (as opposed to a means) test in the ITA may be partly political,
but largely institutional. Without a radical change in the ITA to require the reporting
of all assets, together with a radical change to the administration of the benefit to allow
such reporting, delivering the CCTB as a means-tested benefit is not feasible. How-
ever, the use of a means test for social assistance purposes is clearly a political choice,
172. Professor Brooks, supra note 45 at 325, suggests that reduced stigma occurs because the application
is by mail. If we decided to take applications for social assistance through the mail, it also would lack
stigma.
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as either an income-tested or means-tested benefit can be delivered through a program
which is not tied to the income tax system. If the political will existed to do so, at least
part of the intrusiveness of the social assistance system could be removed by basing
entitlement on income, not means.
Much of the intrusiveness of the social assistance system stems directly from the use
of the "family" as the benefit unit. 173 The fact that entitlement for the CCTB is also
based on "family income" has the potential for vastly increasing the intrusiveness of
the system. As new verification and enforcement procedures are put in place in
response to concerns about "marital misreporting", it may lose this advantage.
Strengthening verification and enforcement procedures into family circumstances is
not gender neutral. The benefit is received mainly by women. In addition, women have
been the ones who have traditionally been targetted for "spouse in the house"
investigations in which social assistance authorities routinely invade the privacy and
abuse the rights of single mothers. 174 The suspicion that single mothers are living the
high life on taxpayers dollars could easily be imported into the CCTB program.
The "spouse in the house" cases resulted (and continue to result) in the denial of
benefits to single mothers and their children without regard to the actual availability
of income from the alleged spouse. This is in part due to the very broad definition of
"spouse" used in social assistance law. 175 The definition of "spouse" in the tax system
requires that unmarried couples be together for at least one year before being consid-
ered spouses. Thus, the assumption that the couple are economically a "family" may
be more supportable in income tax, rather than social assistance, law. 176 The ITA also
requires that there be "cohabitation" in the legal sense. However, most couples are not
aware of the difference between "living together" and "cohabiting", and the available
tax information is not illuminating. This suggests that at least some of the "misreport-
ings" may have arisen from a genuine belief that, although they were living together,
173. Although the issue of the appropriateness of the family as tax unit for benefit programs is outside the
scope of this paper, there are many issues here: including, the assumption that resources are shared
within the "family", the joint liability for any overpayments (including ones based on a husband mis-
reporting of income, which in fact are paid by the wife through a holdback of the CCTB) and prob-
lems associated with the husband refusing to file an income tax return or using it is a "bargaining
chip".
174. Little, supra note 52 at 173-75; M. Leighton, "Handmaids' Tales: Family Benefits Assistance and
the Single-Mother-Led Family" (1987) 45 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 324.
175. Although the definition was amended in 1987 to allow a three year period of cohabitation before
spousal status was determined (Regulation to Amend Regulation 441 of Revised Regulations of
Ontario, 1980 made under the General Welfare Assistance Act, 0. Reg. 590/87, s.1), to bring the
statute into conformity with the Family Law Act, 1986, S.O. 1986, c.4, s.29, this was repealed in
1995 (0. Reg. 410/95, s.1(4)). The OWA, supra note 48, is not identical to the pre-1987 law, but is
similarly broad.
176. See J. Pahl, Money and Marriage (Basingstoke, U.K.: MacMillan, 1989), S.A. Phipps, "Collective
Models of Family Behaviour: Implications for Economic Policy", (Status of Women Economic
Equality Workshop, Ottawa, 29-30 November 1993) [unpublished]; F. Woolley, Intra-Family
Inequality: Implications for the Design of Income Support (CACSW Research Notes, November
1994).
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the relationship did not and should not involve sharing income, rather than from an
intent to mislead. 1
77
Revenue Canada has vast investigative powers under the ITA. If these powers are used
against Canada's most vulnerable citizens, the result could be highly intrusive.
However, two things may mitigate against the repeat of the abuses of the social
assistance system in the delivery of the CCTB. First, current administrative practices
within the tax system make it unlikely that significant resources will be deployed to
do on-site enforcement and investigation of such cases ("home visits"), although this
is not unheard of. Verification and enforcement are more likely to take the form of
cross-checking previous tax returns, addresses and other relevant information, rather
than more overtly intrusive methods.
Second, if there are undeclared co-residents, it is likely that they will include individ-
uals of all income classes. The coercive intimidation tactics used against low income
single mothers are likely to be challenged if used against the middle class. However,
if Revenue Canada identifies low income single mothers as "high risk" for misreport-
ing because they receive the highest benefits, then verification procedures could
indeed target them differently with relative impunity.
The potential for increased intrusiveness noted here results directly from the use of
family income to calculate entitlement. The choice of benefit unit is a political choice,
rather than an institutional necessity. If the tax unit for benefit entitlement was the
individual, then the intrusiveness of the tax system would indeed be less than the social
assistance system. If the social assistance system used the individual as benefit unit
or at least used a narrower definition of spouse, then it would be less intrusive as well
because fewer women would be caught by it.
C. Responsiveness
The lack of responsiveness of the tax system to changing circumstances is a major
disadvantage of tax-delivered income support. Some improvements could be made
within the current structure. Theoretically, it is possible to speed up the CCTB
application process. Further, allowing separated spouses to adjust benefits
immediately upon separation rather than wait ninety days might enable some women
to stay off social assistance, especially if the benefit is enhanced in the future.
However, the lack of responsiveness is largely institutional. Responding to an in-year
loss of income would be almost impossible without vastly expanding and altering the
administrative structure of benefit delivery. As noted above, it can take as long as
eighteen months for benefits to be adjusted following the loss of employment
income. 178 This time lag is the almost inevitable result of basing the amount of a
benefit on information filed in income tax returns.
177. See, for e.g., Bolduc c. R., supra note 108.
178. See discussion under "Eligibility", supra.
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The use of income tax information is conceptually and practically straightforward, and
a family's benefit entitlement can be calculated by simply inputting the income data
into the formula for the CCTB. As a result, some adjustments are administratively
complicated. For example, adjusting the benefit to change the number of qualified
dependants only requires recalculating the benefit formula to increase or decrease the
number of children. Similarly, removing a spouse from the benefit unit upon separation
or death only requires recalculating "family income" to remove that spouse's income
from the formula. Consequently, there is relatively little time delay involved in
adjusting the benefit to reflect these changes in family composition.
However, of necessity information in income tax returns relates to a past period and
is often outdated, placing limits on what adjustments can be made. For example, it is
impossible to adjust benefits to reflect loss of income within the benefit year by a
member of the benefit unit using data from past income returns. This adjustment would
require a system to report loss of income, including the implementation of a system
of regular reporting and monitoring to prevent people from structuring the receipt of
their income to receive more benefits than they are entitled to. 179 Trying to match
current income and current benefits for even a small proportion of the population
would entirely wipe out many of the administrative advantages of using the tax system
at all. Although current recipients cannot get an increase in their CCTB, they get a
"bonus" in the year after they have an increase in income, because they receive high
CCTB benefits at the same time as their income is high. Thus, over a lifetime benefits
received reflect benefits entitled to. This system is simple to administer and low cost
in enforcement and verification, but does not help those families in immediate need.
While it may seem at first glance that lack of responsiveness is almost entirely
institutionally constrained, ultimately responsibility lies with the political decision to
target benefits. Had the government chosen a flat-rate, universal benefit delivered
through the tax system granting the (maximum) benefit to everyone, the problem of
non-responsiveness would have been avoided.1 80 The Family Allowance program did
this, and was specifically rejected in favour of a targeted, income-tested and unrespon-
sive benefit.
D. Dispute Resolution
The dispute resolution process in the tax system is designed to address the needs of
all taxfilers with disputes, not just low-income people who rely on the system for a
substantial portion of their income. Accessibility, delay and formality, even within the
"informal procedure", are serious issues for many low income people. The limited
appeal rights attached to the informal procedure also create a two-tier justice system,
179. For example, switching to monthly current income rather than annualized previous income as a basis
for entitlement would amount to prepayment of tax benefits, which has the same effect as deferral of
tax paid.
180. Including the benefit in taxable income would maintain some form of targeting, without the disad-
vantage of lack of responsiveness. See also Kesselman, supra note 10 at 126-8.
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as there is no right of appeal to Federal Court in the informal system. As well, only
those who can afford legal representation can elect to proceed under the General
Procedure, thereby maintaining their right to appeal to Federal Court if they lose at
Tax Court. Further, while the Tax Court has expertise in tax law, its members do not
have expertise in issues affecting low income people. That said, the lack of specialized
expertise may actually be a positive feature in political climates where experts purport
to "know" that all people on social assistance are defrauding the system. Notwith-
standing this, a well-designed social assistance appeal system has a greater potential
to be timely and accessible and to have expertise in the law and issues affecting low
income people.
E. Tax Expenditure Versus Direct Expenditure Programs
A further disadvantage of using the tax system is the complexity of the ITA itself.
Although the CCTB provisions themselves are relatively short and straightforward,
the benefit is embedded in arguably the most complex and technical piece of legisla-
tion in the country. Because the CCTB provisions interact with the rest of the statute,
reassessments resulting in changes in tax liability will affect eligibility for and the
amount of the CCTB as well as other benefits. Further, any changes in the tax liability
of the cohabiting spouse also affect the CCTB.18s Reassessments can occur for many
reasons, from failing to declare income, to disallowance of a deduction, to retroactive
inclusion of Canada Pension Plan disability income. 182 Because of this complexity,
many people will not attempt to understand how a reassessment was calculated, but
will simply accept that Revenue Canada must be "right" when they issue a reassess-
ment notice. This is a large problem in direct expenditure programs for low income
people and is likely to be an even larger one with the CCTB. 183
Some features of the tax system designed for other purposes may not always be
appropriate for the provision of social benefits. For example, terms used in the CCTB
provisions are defined in the general sections of the ITA which apply to the entire
statute. Because "income" means taxable income with one minor adjustment, 84
taxpayers who have sufficient income to take advantage of tax deductions can reduce
their income to the same level as a taxfiler with much lower actual income. To target
the benefit more closely to people in need would require using a different definition
of "income", distancing it further from the universality of the tax system.
181. For example, a reassessment disallowing a business expense for a-cohabiting spouse could retroac-
tively decrease entitlement to the CCTB for the recipient. This would be recovered from the current
CCTB entitlement, whether or not the recipient was currently living with the cohabiting spouse.
182. ITA, supra note 40, s.120.3.
183. While there is no "hard data" on this, many poverty law advocates have observed that, while many
clients receiving social assistance have overpayments, few can tell them how the overpayments were
calculated.
184. ITA, supra note 40, s.122.6. See discussion supra note 115.
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Expenditures through the tax system differ fundamentally from direct expenditure
programs in the government processes that are used to enact and administer them.
Direct expenditures are deliberated prior to approval, whereas tax expenditures are
often hidden in technical amendments. Even when introduced in the budget, their
interaction with the technical aspects of the ITA make it difficult for lay people to
understand their overall impact, and therefore to contribute to meaningful debate.18 5
It is much easier to hold direct spending programs accountable for money spent and
outcomes achieved.
Finally, locating a benefit program in the tax system also allows the government to
cut benefits while appearing to increase them. For example, the failure to fully index
the CCTB to the inflation rate results from the 1986 enactment of an ITA provision,
long before the CCTB was even conceived. Consequently, the value of child benefits
decreases every year, and yet no rate decrease has ever been announced. Despite
several increases to child benefits announced in the 1992 and 1997 budgets, the actual
value of the benefit in real dollars declined over the period 1985 to 1997 for almost
all families. 186 While the institutional structure facilitates this "social policy by
stealth", 187 the decision not to fully index child benefits is clearly a political choice.
That said, social assistance benefits are not indexed to inflation at all. Delivering child
benefits through the tax system at least requires that they be accorded the same
treatment as other provisions of the ITA, that is, partial indexation.
IV. MEETING THE GOALS OF THE NATIONAL CHILD BENEFIT
THROUGH AN INTEGRATED BENEFIT
This paper began with a discussion of the goals and expectations set for the NCB. We
now return to that discussion in order to address the question of how well the integrated
child benefit can meet those goals, given its current design.
As a measure to "help prevent and reduce the depth of child poverty", the current
benefit is not large enough nor responsive enough to make serious inroads against
child poverty. The failure to fully index the benefit does not bode well for the benefit
as a sincere effort to fight child poverty. Further, the government's method of
evaluating the success of the benefit calls into question its intentions in implementing
the benefit. Currently, a joint federal/ provincial/ territorial working group on social
development research and information is developing a new and narrower definition
185. The failure to measure the effectiveness of tax expenditure programs merited comment in the 1998
Report of the Auditor General, Chapter 8. See also Brooks, supra note 45.
186. R. Shillington, "A Short History of the Child Benefit" (1998) [unpublished] [http'J/home.iSTAR.ca/-ers2/
cbslctbhist/html]. See also K. Battle, No Taxation Without Indexation (Ottawa: Caledon Institute,
1998). The National Council of Welfare predicts that the child benefit will decline by 18% in real
value in 10 years: Kids, supra note 167 at 16.
187. A term coined by Ken Battle, Ibid. at 1, and defined as "the use of arcane and poorly understood
technical changes to public policy which were imposed on the Canadian public without their knowl-
edge, consent or understanding".
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of poverty, which will have the effect of reducing the number of families reported to
be living in "poverty" by defining them out of it. 188
The failure to pass on the enhanced benefit to families on social assistance also makes
a mockery of the goal of fighting child poverty. Under current policy, social assistance
families are not entitled to the benefits of the enriched CCTB because their families
already receive more benefits on behalf of children than non-social assistance working
families. As a result, with the exception of Newfoundland and New Brunswick, the
CCTB supplement is entirely clawed back by the provincial governments. This policy
is incoherent. Children in social assistance families have less because their families
have less overall income. Rather than reducing the depth of child poverty, the clawback
effectively increases the income gap between social assistance families and other
families.
In addition to making the benefit ineffective as an anti-poverty measure, the clawback
essentially punishes children in social assistance families on the basis of the source
of their parents' income, a result the NCB was supposed to be designed to avoid. The
clawback has its greatest impact on single mothers, who comprise the largest number
of families in receipt of the integrated benefit. They are also more likely to receive
assistance for longer periods of time because of labour market disadvantage, child
care responsibilities and lack of sufficient supports. 189 Not only do their children
receive no benefit because of the clawback, they are further entrenched and stigma-
tized as the "undeserving poor". 190
Proponents of the current design argue that the money taken from social assistance
families through the clawback is not really being taken from children because of the
requirement to reinvest the savings in programs for low income families. 191 Although
some provinces have reinvestment strategies which assist all low income people,
others have programs which assist only non-social assistance families. For example,
the main plank of Ontario's reinvestment strategy, the Ontario Child Care Working
Family Supplement, is not available to most working families on social assistance and
is deducted from the benefits of most of those who do receive it.192
188. Federal/Provincial/Territorial Working Group on Social Development Research and Information,
Construction of a Preliminary Market Basket Measure of Poverty (March 1998).
189. Supra note 166 at 27.
190. J. Pulkingham & G. Ternowetsky, "The New Canada Child Tax Benefit: Discriminating Between the
'Deserving' and 'Undeserving' Among Poor Families With Children" in J. Pulkingham & G. Ter-
nowetsky, eds., Child and Family Policies: Struggles, Strategies and Options (Halifax: Femwood,
1997) 204 at 206-7.
191. Battle & Mendelson, supra note 18 at 13.
192. MCSS, "Memo re Ontario Child Care Supplement for Working Families" (23 December 1998). The
Ontario reinvestment strategy also includes child care for parents on social assistance to enable them
to participate in mandatory work or school programs, funding for services such as the Healthy
Babies program, an intervention program for "high risk" babies and child protection services: MCSS,
News Release, "Canada, Provinces Launch New National Benefit Program for Children in Low-
Income Families" (18 June 1998). While these will be used by social assistance families, they do not
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The government's second goal, to "promote attachment to the workforce", appears to
subvert the first goal. A strategy to fight child poverty should not condition benefits
on the behaviour of the parents. Insofar as it does, it looks like a welfare reform
program, or a low wage strategy to assure a supply of cheap labour for employers, 193
rather than an anti-child-poverty program. Even if rewarding labour market participa-
tion were an appropriate goal for a child benefit, the CCTB is poorly designed to
achieve this. For example, a single mother whose entire income comes from support
payments receives the same benefit as she would if she received the same amount of
income from earnings. People with disabilities receiving social assistance are treated
the same way as unemployed able-bodied people, despite differing employment
participation expectations. The CCTB does not promote labour force attachment as
much as it rewards independence from social assistance.
One way in which the NCB is intended to promote labour force attachment is by tearing
down the "welfare wall". 194 The "welfare wall" is a theoretical construct created by
economists, and its empirical reality is highly questionable.195 People receiving social
assistance do not calculate whether their tax-back rate is low enough to make working
worthwhile financially. Most do not consider income from earnings to be qualitatively
the same as income from social assistance; substituting "their" dollars for "welfare's"
dollars is a matter of personal pride and a step towards independence from the system.
To the extent that recipients perceive a "welfare wall", it is the high cost of drugs,
dental and vision care for families who leave social assistance for low-wage work.
The solution, however, is not to claw back the enhanced benefit from social assistance
families, but to provide universal drug, dental and vision care for all children or, at
least, all low income children.
The third goal of the NCB is to simplify administration and harmonize provincial and
federal programs. Unfortunately, the NCB adds a further level of complexity to the
administration of child benefits by requiring an ongoing exchange of information
between two levels of government. In the information age, this may appear simple.
For recipients, it can mean having to straighten out two levels of government, not just
one, as computers and the people who operate them are not infallible. Further,
provincial social assistance programs are increasingly taking on the complexion of
coercive employment services programs, with income support contingent on the
behaviour of the recipient and her dependents. As noted above, harmonizing with these
program objectives may not be appropriate for an anti-child poverty program.
make up for inadequate income support. Further, they send a message that, while non social assis-
tance families deserve cash benefits, social assistance families need servicing. See also supra note 37
at 18-19.
193. B. Kitchen, "The New Child Benefit: Much Ado About Nothing" (1997) 39 C.R.S.P. 65 at 70; C.
Wiggins, The Canada Child Tax Benefit (Research Paper No. 8) (Ottawa: Canadian Labour Con-
gress, 10 December 1997); National Anti-Poverty Organization, supra note 39 at 3.
194. See Canada, supra note 33.
195. Supra note 37 at 48-9.
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The program has fared no better in meeting the goals put forward by social policy
analysts. The program does not meet the goal of horizontal equity in any but the most
cursory way. To meet that goal, the benefit would have to provide child benefits based
on the number of children and possibly on the age of the children. In fact, as a targeted
benefit, the child benefit provides higher benefits based in part on the number and age
of children, but mainly on income and it provides no benefits at all to higher income
families. It thus combines horizontal with vertical equity goals, reducing entitlement
with income, but increasing it with additional children. There is a risk that by
conflating equity goals, the recognition of parental contribution component of the
benefit is obscured, setting the stage for the treatment of children as a consumer choice,
rather than a societal good.
The benefit is more successful in meeting the goal of promoting dignity and indepen-
dence also put forward by social policy analysts. However, the non-intrusiveness of
the process could be short-lived. Further, for those who most lack dignity and
independence, it does not make any difference, as they still receive most or all of their
benefits through the stigmatizing, intrusive and punitive social assistance system.
Reviewing the goals set forth by activists, the CCTB cannot respond to changes in
circumstances which affect the material needs of recipients and is not likely to ever
be able to do so. That is currently the role of social assistance programs and is likely
to remain so for the foreseeable future.
The CCTB is also not available for all children who are actually dependent. In
particular, it is not available to both parents in shared custody situations since one or
the other must receive it. The current social assistance program shares this failing and,
by granting assistance on the basis of which parent is currently receiving the CCTB,
effectively denies many low income parents the ability to share custody. This is also
an example of how harmonizing and simplifying administration can lead to an inability
to meet program objectives of providing income support.
The tax system is not simple and transparent. Although the CCTB provisions are
relatively accessible, the interaction of other tax provisions complicates accessibility.
The dispute resolution process is a serious problem. The Tax Court of Canada, as
"informal" as it might try to be, remains intimidating and inaccessible. People
receiving social assistance and the CCTB must also go to Tax Court as a first step to
resolving some social assistance issues. Many people will give up rather than face
going to Tax Court, especially if legal aid is not available.
To summarize, the child benefit program as it is currently designed does not, and
perhaps .cannot, meet the goals set for it by the government or by the social policy
analysts for many years. Given this conclusion, the remaining sections of this paper
will look at how the benefit fits into larger trends in the Canadian welfare state, and
ways in which the benefit might be improved to meets its goals.
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V. THE NATIONAL CHILD BENEFIT AND HOLLOWING OUT THE
WELFARE STATE
With the introduction of the NCB, the federal government appears to be strengthening
the role of the state in social policy, not reducing it. However, as this analysis has
shown, it is possible to appear to be doing one thing while in fact doing the opposite.
Dismantling the welfare state may be most effective when it appears to still be
functioning, but has no "guts". Time will tell whether or not the NCB heralds a
restructuring of the welfare state or whether it is simply one more bit of evidence of
"vampire capitalism". 196 At this stage, the lack of full indexation, the clawback and
the inadequacy of the benefits unfortunately point to the latter.
Another characteristic of the hollowing out of the welfare state is the privileging of
private support over public support. The fact that families with income from any source
except social assistance receive the benefit of the enriched CCTB, while those
receiving social assistance do not clearly conforms to this pattern. The burden of caring
for children, including the labour market disadvantage which results from it, is thus
almost totally privatized under the NCB. The state's role is to enable private families
to care for their own, not to share the burden of that caring. Further, if their (privatized)
caregiving responsibilities prevent them from full participation in the labour market
as "self-reliant workers", they are also denied the full rights of social citizenship
enjoyed by those who do have that status.
The use of the tax system to deliver income support, with its accompanying institu-
tional constraints, takes a number of social policy issues out of the realm of political
negotiation and reframes the issues. It also allows for contested political issues to be
masked by apparently neutral tax policy concerns. For example, the 1999 federal
budget positioned the CCTB as "tax relief" for low and moderate income taxpayers,
apparently offsetting the tax relief afforded the rich by the rescission of the federal
surtax on taxable incomes over $65,000.197 The debate changed from whether more
should be done to address child poverty to whether tax relief was fairly apportioned
among income groups.
Finally, the mechanism of cooperative federalism not only allows both levels of
government to claim credit for addressing child poverty, it also enables each to avoid
responsibility for the weaknesses of the program. The federal government can justifi-
ably blame the provinces for reinvestment strategies that don't benefit all low income
families. The provinces can also rightly point to the failure of the federal government
to commit more money for the program. However, as a consequence, the ability of
low income families and their advocates to organize and lobby effectively to improve
the program is greatly reduced.
196. M.G. Cohen, "From the Welfare State to Vampire Capitalism" in Evans & Wekerle, supra note 13,
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Despite flaws, the CCTB may be a positive move which can be built on. However, if
the NCB is to do more than promote the appearance that governments care about child
poverty, several factors must be addressed immediately. The amount of the CCTB
must be raised quickly to a level sufficient to support children, and it must be fully
indexed. It must be available to all families in poverty, not just those who are not forced
to rely on social assistance. Anything else is smoke and mirrors.
The benefit must be made more responsive to changing circumstances, by making the
benefit a taxable universal flat rate benefit. Alternatively, mid-year adjustments should
be made through social assistance authorities, based on an income test only. Failing
either of these, children will either have to live in greater poverty until the benefit can
be adjusted sometime in the following eighteen months, or their families will have to
turn to social assistance.
In cases of joint custody more flexibility is needed. Parents should be able to choose
which parent receives the benefit as is the case currently, but if they cannot agree, then
the option to split the benefit should be available. This would allow receipt by both
parents, allowing them to better meet the needs of their children throughout the year
and ensuring that the benefit could not be used as a weapon against the other parent.
While this might have been cumbersome in the past, with current information tech-
nology it should not prove difficult to implement. It does, however, require a legisla-
tive change.
Administrators must be aware of the potential increase in intrusiveness if single
parents are targeted for enhanced verification of marital status. The relative lack of
intrusiveness currently perceived as an advantage in tax-delivered benefits may turn
out to be transitory, at least for women who comprise the bulk of single parents.
Finally, there must be a change in the way we think about child poverty. While the
goal of "taking children off welfare" has a stirring ring to it, the rhetoric is misleading.
Children are in fact "on welfare" as long as their parents are. They do not know the
difference, and their schoolmates, teachers and the rest of society do not treat them
differently if their benefits come through the tax system, but their parents' benefits
come through the social assistance system. 198
The CCTB and the NCB cannot solve child poverty because the cause of child poverty
is adult poverty and the program is not designed to address adult poverty. As Leonard
Marsh suggested 50 years ago, a national child benefit is part of, but only part of, a
comprehensive income security plan for Canadians. 199 If we really care about child
poverty,.we need to address labour market poverty through good job creation, raising
the minimum wage and other measures designed to increase the labour market income
of parents.
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We must also recognize that not all parents will be able to take advantage of an
improved labour market at all times and some will inevitably require social assistance
to support their families. Accordingly, we must re-examine the basic purpose of social
assistance programs, and we need to revisit the assumptions on which reforms to social
assistance are being made. As long as receipt of social assistance is conditioned on the
behaviour of parents, children will be punished for their parents' perceived transgres-
sions. As long as social assistance is stigmatizing, intrusive and mean-spirited,
children will suffer. A national child benefit system is no substitute for a caring and
compassionate welfare system, based on dignity, respect and the full rights of social
citizenship.
